Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 2 Issue 2 - March 1972

Article 5

3-1972

Recent Cases
Law Review Staff

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Constitutional
Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Law Review Staff, Recent Cases, 25 Vanderbilt Law Review 397 (1972)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol25/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Freedom of Information
Act-Unclassified Documents Physically Connected with
Classified Documents May Not Be Withheld Under the
National Security and Foreign
Affairs Secrets Exemption
Appellants brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)' to obtain several documents 2 pertaining to an underground
nuclear test explosion scheduled to take place off Amchitka Island,
Alaska. Appellee, the Environmental Protection Agency, had refused to
produce the documents, which included an attached, but unclassified,
memorandum from the Council on Environmental Equality concerning
the probable environmental consequences of the planned test. Appellants
maintained that the national defense and foreign affairs secrets exemption to the FOIA 3 requires that each document an agency wishes to
withhold be classified by a separate executive order. Appellee argued
that, under Executive Order No. 10,501,1 a group of physically connected documents should be classified no lower than the most highly
classified document therein. Accepting appellee's argument, the district
court refused to compel disclosure.5 On appeal to the United States
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). The Act requires federal agencies to make information available
to any person, unless the information falls within one of the 9 enumerated exemptions specified in
the Act.
2. The documents-which dealt with the environmental, national defense, and foreign relatims consequences of the planned test-were prepared by a special committee established by the
President on January 20, 1969, as part of the National Security Council system. The Committee
was established to review the annual underground nuclear test program. Representative Patsy T.
Mink of Hawaii asked the White House for copies of the report. When her request was denied,
Representative Mink and 32 other members of Congress brought this suit.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) permits the withholding ofinformation if it is: "specifically required
by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy ....
4. 3 C.F.R. § 292 (Supp. 1971). Paragraph (b) of § 3 of Executive Order No. 10,501
provides: "The classification of a file or group of physically connected documents shall be at least
as high as that of the most highly classified document therein."
5. The district court concluded that all the documents were within the national security and
foreign affairs exemption and that the documents also were covered by the inter-agency memoranda
exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970) permits withholding matters if they are "inter-agency or
intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
Such internal governmental communications were first
agency in litigation with the agency ....
recognized as privileged in United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1940). In Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958), protection was said to focus
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, held, reversed
and remanded. Documents that are associated with separately classified
papers, but that are not independently classified as secret do not qualify
for the national defense and foreign affairs secrets exemption. Mink v.
Environmental Protection Agency, No. 17-1708 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 15,

1971).
Throughout the history of our government, the judiciary has been

confronted with the task of achieving a socially desirable balance between the individual's right of access to government-held information
and the government's legitimate interest in the nondisclosure of such
information. As early as 1875, in Totten v. United States,6 the Supreme
Court refused to grant an individual the enforcement of a secret govern-

ment service contract on the grounds that the existence of a contract of
that nature is itself a fact not to be disclosed and that disclosure of the

service contracted for might compromise or embarrass the Government
in performing its public duties or in engaging in foreign relations. 7 This
early judicial recognition that the executive may withhold information
the disclosure of which would endanger the national security or obstruct

the Government's conduct of foreign affairs has been followed repeatedly in subsequent cases. 8 The Supreme Court, however, has acknowlon the "consultative functions of government." From the view that the privilege was intended to
protect the administrator's mental processes, the courts restricted the common-law privilege to
inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda containing opinions or recommendations that are part of
the decision-making process, but the privilege has been held not to apply to memoranda that are
mere factual reports. See, e.g., Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (accident report
by Air Force concerning airplane crash); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (documents of Renegotiation Board). This distinction has received congressional sanction in exemption 5 of the FOIA. See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. April 13,
197 1) (document evaluating Government's program for developing a supersonic transport aircraft);
Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (FTC staff investigative reports);
Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (document held by Commissioner of Food and
Drugs relating to hazard of carbon tetrachloride); American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d
696 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (staff memorandum of Maritime Subsidy Board for Department of Commerce); Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (documents held by Secretary of
Agriculture). In the instant case, the court stated that, while this exemption protects the decisional
processes of the President and other officials, it does not prevent disclosure of factual information,
unless it is inextricably intertwined with the policy-making processes. Under the circuit court's
remand order, the district court will examine the documents in question in camera and can deny
disclosure under this exemption only for those documents that involve internal communications of
advice or opinions that are a part of the policy-making process.
6. 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (individual made contract with President Lincoln to do clandestine
work in the South during the Civil War).
7. Id. at 106.
8. See, e.g., Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (report is privileged if
disclosure would reveal a military secret or constitute a threat to the national security); Pollen v.
Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (secrecy required concerning invention of
military device); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912) (subject
matter of information contained in drawings is privileged as government secret in military matter).
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edged that, although there exists an executive privilege to protect military and state secrets, the judiciary cannot wholly abdicate its control
over the evidence in a case and over what information permissibly may
be withheld to the discretion of executive officers? In United States v.
Reynolds, 0 the Court identified the problem as essentially one of the
court's determining the appropriateness of the Government's claim of
privilege in a manner that will not force disclosure of the very thing that
the privilege is designed to protect. In assessing this request for secrecy,
the Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the trial court to look at
all the circumstances of the case to ascertain whether there is a reasonable danger that disclosure of the evidence would expose matters that,
in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. If the trial
court finds the existence of such danger, the Government's claim of
privilege must be upheld without further judicial inquiry. The Court
concluded that the extent to which the trial court should probe to determine whether disclosure of certain materials presents a reasonable danger to the national security depends upon the strength of the showing of
necessity for disclosure. Even a strong showing of necessity, however,
would make no difference if the court were satisfied that military secrets
were involved." In response to these judicial decisions, Congress, in
1946, enacted section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which was intended to increase public disclosure of administrative action.'1 Nevertheless, certain broad exceptions to the general policy compelling disclosure that were included in the Act when secrecy is required
"in the public interest" or when information is designated as confidential "for good cause"' 13 allowed the Act to be used as an effective instrument through which officials in the executive branch could justify nondisclosure of a large variety of material.' 4 Executive Order No. 10,501,
issued by President Eisenhower in November 1953, furnished further
justification for nondisclosure practices and permitted blanket nondisclosure by providing that "[t]he classification of a file or group of
physically connected documents shall be at least as high as that of the
9. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (report resulting from investigation of crash
of military aircraft in flight to test secret electronic equipment held privileged).

10.
II.
12.
U.S.C.
13.
14.
L. REv.

Id. at 8.
Id.at 10-11.
Administrative Procedure Act § 3, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), as amended, 5
§ 552 (1970).
Id.
See Editorial Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A CriticalReview, 38 GEO. WASH.
150 (1969).
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most highly classified document therein." 1 5 Thirteen years later,
Congress, perceived the need to reassert the announced policy of
full public disclosure, and bolstered it by amending section 3 of the
APA with the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act." This
Act grants to any person a cause of action to obtain any identifiable
record of a government agency that is improperly withheld. The Act
vests the federal district courts with jurisdiction to conduct trials
de novo in cases concerning the propriety of refusals to disclose and
places the burden of proof on the agency to show that nondisclosure
is justified under one of the nine exemptions specifically provided
for in the Act. 17 One of these exemptions, subsection 552(b)(1), 18 is
the statutory recognition of the executive privilege to withhold
information relating to national defense and foreign policy. The
Senate committee report described the change from the broad "in
the public interest" standard for exemption under old section 3 to the
national defense and foreign affairs secrets exemption of subsection
(b)(1) as an attempt "both to delimit more narrowly the exception and
to give it a more precise definition."' 9 The House committee report
referred to the exemption as covering those "categories of information
which the President has determined must be kept secret to protect the
national defense or to advance foreign policy, such as matters classified
pursuant to Executive Order 10,501 ."20 The Attorney General's office
interpreted the reference in the House report to Executive Order No.
10,501 as an indication that no great degree of specificity is required in
identifying matters to be covered by this exemption. 21 In 1970, the Ninth
Circuit in Epstein v. Resor 22 accepted the interpretations placed upon the
national security and foreign affairs secrets exemption by the House
committee report and the Attorney General's memorandum. The court
found that under subsection (b)(1), the legislature had expressly assigned
to the executive the function of determining whether secrecy is required
in the national interest. Furthermore, the court concluded that judicial
review was limited to the question whether an appropriate executive
15.

3 C.F.R. § 292 (Supp. 1971).

16. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
17. Id.; see 83 HARV. L. REV. 928 (1970).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970) (permits withholding information under executive order "in
... ).
the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
19. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965).
20. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1966).
21. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION
SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 (1967).
22. 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970) (suit by historian to obtain Army file dealing with forced
repatriation of Soviet citizens following World War I1).
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order invoking nondisclosure under the foreign affairs and national security secrets exemption had been promulgated on the material in question; judicial review of the factual basis for the administrative determination to classify certain documents as secret was precluded as constituting
a political decision on matters not appropriately within the province of
the courts.23The court in Epstein limited the scope of judicial inquiry
under subsection (b)(1) to a determination whether the agency decision
to withhold information was clearly arbitrary or capricious. This inquiry, in turn, was limited by the court to an investigation of the origin
of the file contents and the surrounding circumstances, thus precluding
24
any in camera examination of the file.
In the instant case, the court initially recognized that the purpose
of Congress in enacting the FOIA was to require federal agencies to
make information available to any person, unless the information
sought is withheld for a purpose enumerated in the nine exemptions to
the disclosure rule. Although the legislative history of the Act does not
define clearly the relationship between Executive Order No. 10,501 and
the national security and foreign affairs secrets exemption, the court
acknowledged that Executive Order No. 10,501 consistently has been the
authority for classification of matters relating to national defense. Since
it could find no rational basis for withholding on security grounds a
document that had no independent need for classification and that was
included in a file or was physically connected with classified documents,21 the court determined that such attached, but unclassified documents are not included within the national security and foreign affairs
secrets exemption. The court declared that this determination was made,
even though it was inconsistent with Executive Order No. 10,501, because the terms and purposes of the FOIA, which was enacted subsequent to the Executive Order, demanded such a finding. The court emphasized that the congressional policy against secrecy by association
manifested in the FOIA dictates that, if the nonsecret components of a
file are separable from the secret remainder and may be read separately
without distortion of meaning, these nonclassified items must be dis-

closed .2
23.

Id. at 933.

24. Id.
25. The court pointed out that this is not the type of case in which mere disclosure of the
fact of the inquiry is itself impermissible.
26. Regarding the inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda exemption, the court merely
stated that it would follow the interpretation it had recently placed upon the exemption in Soucie
v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir., 1971), when it held that the exemption does not prevent the
disclosure of factual information, unless that information is inextricably intertwined with the
policy-making process.
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The decision in the instant case marks a departure from the restrictive interpretation placed upon the FOIA by the House report,2 the
Attorney General's memorandum,2 and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Epstein.29 By accepting the Senate committee's interpretation 0 that the
purpose of the FOIA is to enable the public to obtain access to the
information necessary for it to deal effectively and upon an equal footing
with federal agencies, 3 1 the instant court reasoned that the national security and foreign affairs secrets exemption is to be afforded a narrow and
precise construction. The Epstein decision, by limiting judicial review of
agency classifications to the question whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously, severely undermined the effectiveness of the FOIA
and increased the agencies' broad discretionary powers regarding disclosure.3 2 In this case, however, the court recognized that it was congressional disapproval of broad agency discretion that led Congress to provide for de novo court review of agency determinations to withhold
information; therefore the court limited agency discretion by construing
the grant of de novo jurisdiction as encompassing the authority to resolve the issue whether an exemption applies under a particular factual
setting. In exercising this jurisdiction, the court rendered the physically
connected documents provision of Executive Order No. 10,50 133 a nullity
by concluding that it was superseded and overruled by the FOIA. This
action removes a significant basis upon which administrative officials
have been able in the past to obtain blanket nondisclosure of a variety
of matters under the national security and foreign affairs secrets exemption and is in keeping with the congressional attitude that the FOIA is
not a withholding statute but rather a disclosure statute.34
The decision in the instant case is socially desirable because it encourages a policy of full public disclosure that serves to check possible
administrative abuses of power. The court's analysis, however, failed to
establish a structural approach that could be utilized by administrative
officials and courts for evaluating future requests for disclosure of information which arguably could come within the national security and
foreign affairs secrets exemption. The court did firmly establish that
27.

H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 20.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 30.
29. 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970).
30. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 19.
31. See Davis, The InformationAct: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (1967).
32. Hoerster, The 1966 Freedom of Information Act-Early Judicial Interpretations,44
WASH. L. REv. 641 (1969).
33. 3 C.F.R. § 292 (Supp. 1971).
34. See S. RaP. No. 813, supra note 19.

28.
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unclassified documents physically connected to classified documents
may not be withheld, but failed to decide the more difficult question
whether and to what extent courts may question the classification and
withholding of information under an executive order requesting that
specific material be kept secret in the interest of national security or
foreign policy. If the grant of de novo jurisdiction to federal district
courts is to be truly significant, it must incorporate the unrestricted
power to evaluate whether a particular exemption, including the national
security exemption, may be invoked appropriately in a given situation.
Rather than adhere to a technical interpretation of the wording of the
nine exemptions, as has been done heretofore, the courts should evaluate
administrative decisions that refuse disclosure by balancing the interest
of the individual and the public at large in acquiring the information
against the interest of the government in nondisclosure. 35 In conducting
such an evaluation, the courts should consider the particular nature of
the agency concerned, the mischief to which the exemption is directed,
the specific record involved, and the fact that the FOIA places the
burden of proving that nondisclosure is appropriate on the agency. 3 Few
individual citizens have the financial resources and time to file suit
against an agency under the FOIA; consequently, unless the judiciary,
the executive, and the legislative branches cooperate to create an atmosphere of openness throughout the government, 37 most bureaucrats simply will ignore the disclosure requirements of the FOIA when dealing
with individual citizens. Although this decision supports and strengthens
the policy of full disclosure, the goal of a truly free and knowledgeable
electorate will not be attained while the executive has the unfettered
discretion to deny disclosure whenever su'ch action is believed to be in
the interest of the national security.
35,
36.
37.

See Davis, supra note 31, at 765.
See Hoerster, supra note 32.
Nader, Freedom From Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5

RIGHTS-CIV. LIB.

L.

REV. 1 (1970).
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Antitrust-Treble Damage Class Actions-Privity with
Defendant Required To Maintain Suit
Plaintiff, City of Denver, alleging that defendant asphalt manufacturers had conspired to overprice asphalt, brought a class action seeking
treble damages' for violation of section I of the Sherman Act.2 Plaintiff
purported to represent a class composed of itself and all other governmental entities in the State of Colorado that either directly or indirectly
had purchased asphalt from defendants. Defendants argued that the

Supreme Court's recent rejection of the passing-on defense 3 implied a
requirement of privity between the complainant and the alleged conspirators before an action for antitrust violations could be maintained. Because only a small number of the proposed class members possessed this
privity, 4 defendants contended that joinder of these remaining parties
would be more practicable than maintenance of the suit as a class action.5 Pursuant to Federal Rule 23 (c),1 the District Court for the District

of Colorado, held, judgment for defendants. The abolition of the
passing-on defense creates a requirement that privity exist between the
plaintiff and the alleged antitrust violator before an action for treble
damages may be maintained under section 4 of the Clayton Act. City &
County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971).
Section 4 of the Clayton Act 7 provides a treble damage remedy for

those injured as a result of any violation of the antitrust laws. Because
the language and the legislative history of the Act suggests that the only
1. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or pioperty by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1970),formerly Sherman Act § 7, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890).
2. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States . . is declared to be illegal.
... Sherman Act
§ 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
3. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). See also text
accompanying notes 16-20 infra.
4. The proposed class was to include 126 governmental agencies, of which it was estimated
that less than 10 had purchased asphalt directly from the named defendants.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) requires that "the class [be] so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) also was relevant to the defendants' argument.
This rule requires that before an action may be maintained as a class action, it must appear "that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."
6. "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action,
the court shall determine whether it is to be so maintained." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(!).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). For the text of § 4 see note I supra.
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prerequisite to the maintenance of this private action is a showing that
an injury has been sustained," the courts have had the burden of determining what will constitute a recognizable injury. 9 This task has been
particularly difficult when the courts have had to treat multi-tiered
transactions in which a seller, in violation of the antitrust laws, sells to
an original purchaser, who in turn conveys the merchandise to a subsequent purchaser. These transactions raise the question of which purchaser has sustained the injury necessary to invoke section 4. Although
early Senate debate emphasized the treble damage action as a remedy
designed primarily for the ultimate consumer,"0 early Supreme Court
pronouncements declared that, when an illegally excessive price was
exacted, it was the immediate purchaser who sustained injury under the
Act; that his claim accrued at the moment of the overcharge; and that
the law did not reach into subsequent dispositions of the acquired property."1 This position was somewhat modified, however, in the Oil Jobber
8. See 21 CONG. REC. 1767 (1890) (remarks of Senator George on the private remedy
proposed in § 7 of the original Sherman bill); id. at 2615 (remarks of Senator Coke). Nowhere in
the legislative history is the term "injury" defined. Cf. Pollock, Standing To Sue, Remoteness of
Injury, and the Passing-OnDoctrine, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 8-9 (1966); Comment, Should
"Injury" in Treble Damage Suits Be Redefined?, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 141, 142 (1956). The Supreme
Court has acknowledged the all-inclusive nature of the language of § 4: "The statute does not
confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors or to sellers. Nor does it
immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these. The Act is comprehensive in its
terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbiddenpractices by whomever
they may beperpetrated." Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 236 (1948) (emphasis added; citations omitted). See also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961): "[T]o state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under [§ 4], allegations adequate to show a violation and . . . that plaintiff was damaged thereby
are all the law requires."
9. For a discussion of the closely related problem of standing in antitrust actions generally
see Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on Standing To Sue
and Causation Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 351 (1971); McGuire,
The Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote PurchasersTo Recover Treble Damages Under
HanoverShoe, 33 U. Prr. L. REV. 177, 179-83 (1971); Pollock, supra note 8.
10. "An advance in price to the middlemen is not mentioned in the bill, for the obvious reason
that no such advance would damnify them; it would rather be a benefit . . . . [W]hatever [price]
he pays he receives when he sells, together with a profit on his investment . . . . The consumer,
therefore . . . is the party necessarily damnified or injured." 21 CONG. REc. 1767 (1890) (remarks
of Senator George). In determining the legislative intent behind the treble damage remedy in the
Clayton Act, emphasis must be focused on the enactment o4Lhe Sherman Act, which was the first
statute prescribing such a remedy. Although the language of § 4 of the Clayton Act differs from
that used in § 7 of the Sherman Act, no change in the purpose of the remedy was intended in the
second statute. Cf 51 CONG. REC. 9164 (1914). See also H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. I, at 14 (1914) (dealing with § 5 of the later Act).
I1. E.g., Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) (discriminatory rate structure in foreign
shipping); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (excessive
prices for iron pipes which were needed by city for its waterworks system). See also Adams v. Mills,
286 U.S. 397 (1932) (excessive charges for unloading railroad stock cars); Southern Pac. Co. v.
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Cases,'" which were a series of lower federal court decisions that denied
recovery to immediate purchasers on the theory that a middleman who
recoups his losses resulting from the alleged violation by exacting a

higher price from his customers has not incurred injury within the meaning of section 4. This rationale became the basis of the "passing-on"
defense, the theory being that a plaintiff is not injured when he has
"passed-on" the allegedly excessive prices to the ultimate consumer.
Shifting the emphasis from the compensatory effect to the deterrent
effect of treble damage litigation on future violators,' subsequent decisions refused to follow the passing-on doctrine when no alternative right
of action vested in the ultimate consumer. 4 Underlying these decisions
was the apprehension that, if followed in these .circumstances, the
passing-on doctrine would effectively immunize the antitrust offender
from the legal consequences of his violations. Moreover, the courts reasoned that if a windfall were to result, it was preferable for it to accrue

to an innocent plaintiff than a guilty defendant.' Judicial dissatisfaction
Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918) (reparation for excessive freight rates on hardwood lumber).
12. See, e.g., Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 734 (1945) (margin of profit maintained by "passing-on" higher prices to customers);
Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 792 (1944) (transfer of excessive prices inferred); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119
F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941) (failure to prove lessened profit margins).
See also Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958) (dicta); Wolfe v.
National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955) (dicta).
13. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 136
(1968) ("a vital means for enforcing the antitrust policy of the United States"); Quemos Theatre
Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.N.J. 1940) ("ancillary force of private
investigators to supplement the Department of Justice"). See also Comment, ProofRequirements
in Anti-Trust Suits: The Obstaclesto Treble DamageRecovery, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 130, 138 (1950).
But see Parker, Treble Damage Actions-A Financial Deterient to Antitrust Violations?, 16
ANTITRUST BULL. 483 (1971); Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or
Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1940). A maximum criminal penalty of $5,000 for each antitrust
violation is provided in 15 U.S.C. § 21(b. There has been some advocacy for major increases in
the fine so as to reduce reliance on § 4 as a deterrent to future violations. Cf. Pollock, supra note
8, at 38.
14. In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964),
public utilities were permitted to recover for price fixing by manufacturers of electrical equipment,
despite defendants' charges that these prices had been passed-on to the customers of the plaintiffs.
An earlier decision, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963), had denied the ultimate consumers of electricity standing
to intervene in this action on the theory that the proximate cause of the consumers' injury was not
the antitrust violation but the intervening actions of the public utilities. Accord, Atlantic City Elec.
Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y.), interlocutoryappealdenied, 337 F.2d 844
(2d Cir. 1964).
15. E.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203, 209 (7th
Cir. 1964).
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with the doctrine culminated with Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.,"6 in which the Supreme Court held that, to have a
prima facie case of injury, a buyer must show only that he has been
charged an illegally excessive price and that he can identify the amount
of the overcharge; when both of these are satisfied, a buyer can maintain
a suit for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The Court reasoned
that a suit by the merchandiser was the only practical means of prevent17
ing a guilty manufacturer from enjoying the "fruits of his illegality,"'
because the ultimate consumers of retailed merchandise, although possibly vested with a legal cause of action, had little incentive to institute a
lawsuit.' 8 From this seemingly broad denunciation of the passing-on
defense, the Court excepted those situations in which it can be shown
that the direct purchaser resold the merchandise in issue at a predetermined percentage of profit, on a "cost-plus" basis." Although Hanover
helped to clarify the legal positions of immediate purchasers, the decision left unclear whether the presumption against the applicability of the
passing-on defense creates the inverse presumption that, except in those
limited "cost-plus" situations, the ultimate consumer has no enforceable claim against the same manufacturer. Addressing this issue in
PhiladelphiaHousing Authority v. American Radiator&StandardSanitary Corp.,2 0 a federal district court held that in order to prevent multiple liability of the defendant, the presumption created by Hanover
against passing-on by an immediate purchaser required a similar presumption that an ultimate consumer has not sustained the injury necessary to bring suit under section 4.21 Accordingly, the court denied standing to individual homeowners in an action against the manufacturers of
plumbing fixtures installed in plaintiffs' homes. In further support of its
holding, the court reasoned that because of the number of transactions
between the actual sale of the fixtures and the subsequent purchase of
16. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
17. Id. at 489.
18. Id. at 494. It was reasoned further that to allow the defense would require the insuperable
task of determining the extent of an alleged pass-on. Id. at 492-93.
19. This "cost-plus exception" was applied in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1971), in which the court held that retail and wholesale druggists resold antibiotics
which had been illegally overpriced by the manufacturers at a fixed margin of profit, and, as such,
the passing-on doctrine could be invoked in allocating a settlement award between druggists and

consumers.
20. 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd sub nora., Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Philadelphia Housing Authority v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (public housing
authority denied standing to sue on the same grounds).
21. 50F.R.D.at30.
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the homes, it would be impossible to trace the excess charges to the
22
ultimate purchasers.

The instant court initially analyzed the prerequisites for the maintenance of a class action and determined that the practicability of main-

taining the suit as a class action depended on a finding that questions
of law and fact common to the proposed class predominate over any
questions peculiar to individual class members. z To make a conclusive

determination on this issue, the court reasoned that it was first necessary
to ascertain defendants' section 4 liability to the proposed class members.? Addressing the question of liability, the court interpreted Hanover

to mean that, whenever a direct purchaser brings suit under section 4,
he will recover for his injuries so long as it cannot readily be shown that
he has recouped his additional cost by passing it on to his customers on
a cost-plus basis. The court recognized that to permit recovery by the

ultimate consumer in non-cost-plus situations could result in multiple
treble liability.25 Moreover, the court expressed great concern for the
difficulty of tracing an allegedly excessive price through a series of transactions to the ultimate consumer and for the immense burden such a

process would place on the courts. 26 Accordingly, the court felt that
certain limitations must be prescribed and, therefore, reasoned that
Hanover not only created a presumption against use of the passing-on

defense in suits instituted by direct purchasers, but that it also estab22. Id. at 25-26.
23. See materials cited note 5 supra.
24. "We do not disagree that the ultimate decision as to the standing/remoteness/pass-on
issues must await development of the facts, but we believe that at least where the apparent facts
are such as here exist, the factual differences among potential class members-differences affecting
liability-should be recognized before a case is determined to be a class action. . . . Appropriate
use of the discovery procedures should establish the essential facts as to the passing-on of the alleged
improper charges, and the issue as to most potential class members may well become ripe for
decision on motion for summary judgment. If a class action were to be determined to be appropriate
at this time, the summary judgment route will be effectively barricaded before the court has a fair
chance to look at a problem which may be dispositive of the case as to many members of the
proposed class." 53 F.R.D. at 633.
25. "If the 'passing-on' defense is available to a defendant, he would be excused from liability
to the first purchaser, and there would be no risk of double liability trebled, but if that defense is
not available, to permit recovery by one who bought only indirectly would subject the manufacturer
to possible multiple liability trebled, and this we think goes beyond the policy of Congress in
enacting the antitrust laws." Id. at 63 1.
26. "The difficulty in tracing any overcharge for asphalt into a completed job will vary from
job to job. . . . [T]he claims of the class members and their right to recover will vary from potential
class member to potential class member dependent upon the type of contract entered into by
them-not contracts entered into with countless contractors whose bidding formulae will all be
different. To try this case as a class action might be an accountant's paradise, but it would be a
court's purgatory." Id. at 636-37.
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lished a similar presumption that ultimate consumers had no standing
to sue for excessive prices further up the chain of distribution. The court
completed its treatment of Hanover by holding that the case implicitly
set forth a requirement of privity of contract between the plaintiff and
the antitrust violator before a suit for treble damages under section 4 of
the Clayton Act could be maintained, except in the limited cost-plus
situations. Turning back to the propriety of the instant class action, the
court concluded that, since only a small number of the proposed class
possessed the requisite privity with the alleged violators, maintenance of
a class action would be less practicable procedurally than a joinder of
the injured parties.27
The private cause of action created by section 4 of the Clayton Act
serves two pronounced functions: the redress of injury and the enforcement of the antitrust provisions. The instant court's insistence on privity
between a purchaser of overpriced goods and the antitrust violator raises
a number of questions relating to the furtherance of each of these two
functions. By imposing the requirement of privity before a suit may be
entertained under section 4, the court has obscured a major policy recognized by court decisions, including Hanover, since the inception of the
Act: the need to promote private treble damage actions as an effective
supplement to the Justice Department's enforcement of the antitrust
laws of the United States.3 The importance of this enforcement facet of
the private remedy is suggested by the unprecedented growth of treble
damage actions during the decade of the 1960's .2 Imposition of a privity
requirement effectively forecloses most ultimate consumers from bringing suit under section 4 and increases the opportunities for the antitrust
offender to avoid civil liability. The possibility that such violations will
not be legally scrutinized is greatly enhanced by the likelihood that many
immediate purchasers-those possessing the requisite privity-may feel
compelled to forego their claims in order to avoid jeopardizing longstanding, and often quite valuable, business relations with the defendant.30 Thus, reliance on the broad concept of privity of contract must
27. The court designed "a rather loose intervention procedure" to afford those indirect
purchasers claiming under a cost-plus purchasing agreement to intervene individually in the suit.

The direct purchasers, of course, were joined automatically.
28. See cases and materials cited note 13 supra.
29. The number of private suits filed under § 4-excluding the electrical equipment industry
cases-have been reported by year as follows: 1960, 228; 1961, 341; 1962, 266; 1963, 283; 1964,
317; 1965, 443; 1966,444; 1967, 536; 1968,659; 1969,740. Parker, supra note 13, at 483 n.3. Parker

suggests that the increase may reflect an increase in the number of violations rather than any
increased awareness of relief through private antitrust litigation. Id. at 484.
30. 547 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RaP., No. 547, at B-3 (Jan. 25, 1972) (analysis of

instant case).
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be limited severely, or preferably disallowed on the appellate level, in
order to promote the enforcement function of section 4. Moreover, the
conclusion that a requirement of privity was implicit in Hanover is
untenable and violative of the spirit of that decision. Admittedly, the
High Court did express concern for the difficulty of tracing illegally
excessive prices to the ultimate consumer, a position with which the
instant court appears to be obsessed, but it must be recognized that it
did so in the context of preventing a defendant from escaping liability
by his arguing that the excessive prices injured more remote purchasers
than the plaintiff. When this fact is examined along with the Hanover
Court's express doubts that the ultimate consumers would bring suit, it
becomes apparent that the Court was concerned primarily with preventing the alleged violator from profiting from his illegal activity without
bearing the attendant legal consequences. 31 Furthermore, it cannot be
overlooked that section 4 had the additional purpose of remunerating
those injured. 32 To believe that the ultimate consumer is never injured,
except in those situations involving a cost-plus operation, is an exercise
in fiction. By adopting such an attitude, the instant court is dealing with
extremes--discounting the probability that many pass-on situations are
not complete, with both parties absorbing a share of defendant's injurious practices. Thus reason and policy considerations dictate that the
cost-plus situation not be interpreted as the exclusive exception to
Hanover but merely as an example of those instances in which proof of
a partial or complete pass-on would not be overly taxing. 33 Also, the fact
that Hanoverdid not expressly preclude a suit by the ultimate consumer,
but merely elicited doubt that such an action would be maintained,
intimates that the Court recognized that such an action could be
brought. Moreover, this disbelief that a suit by the ultimate purchasers
would be instituted has been dissipated greatly by the growth of consumer actions since the decision in Hanover,3 and could be dissipated
even more by a liberal allowance of parenspatriaesuits by the states on
behalf of their consuming citizenry. 35 Thus rather than prescribing a
See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
See materials cited note 8 supra.
"[T]here might be situations-for instance, when an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing
'cost-plus' contract thus making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged-whenthe considerations requiring that the passing-on defense not be permitted. . . would not be present." Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,494 (1968) (emphasis added).
34. Cf. Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 6 (1971).
35. McGuire, supra note 9, at 196 & n.63. The parens patriae action has not met with a
favorable response. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982, 986, 988 (D. Hawaii
31.
32.
33.
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conclusive rule that lacks the flexibility needed for the courts to adjudicate fairly the many diversified factual situations presented by antitrust
actions, a far better rule would be to decide this question on a case-by-

case basis, with some discretionary power vested in the district court to
determine when the problem of ascertaining the ultimate consumers'

injuries becomes so insurmountable that no section 4 suit should be
maintained. 36 To the extent that the instant decision involved such a
finding, it is palatable; it is the privity language with its far-reaching

effects that is a source of concern. Finally, the instant court's compromise of the deterrent and retributive functions of private treble damage

actions in order to eliminate a defendant's risk of multiple liability,
although understandable in light of the general confusion of substantive
and procedural law that besets the courts' decisions in this area, 37 was
unnecessary, for the threat of multiple liability can be diminished greatly
through the proper employment of procedural devices. One such mechanism would be for the antitrust defendant to move to join both the
immediate and subsequent purchasers in the same action under Federal

Rule 19 as indispensable parties.3 1Of course, the feasibility of this procedure will depend on whether the parties to be joined are subject to service
of process by the court and whether such a joinder would deprive the
court of subject matter jurisdiction.39 An alternative method would be
for the defendant to consolidate the claims of all the parties into a single

action by means of interpleader. 0 This method, however, is not without
1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), affd, 40 U.S.L.W. 4246 (U.S. Mar.
i, 1972); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 309
F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (E.D. Pa. 1969). But cf. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079,
1089 (2d Cir. 1971) (dicta). For a general discussion of the need for more parens patriae suits under
the antitrust laws see Comment, Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept of Parens Patriae Suits
for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. Rav. 570, 592-93 (1970).
36. Cf. McGuire, supra note 9, at 203.
37. See materials cited note 9 supra.
38. McGuire, supra note 9, at 201-02.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) provides: "A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court ofjurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined
as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. .. ."
40. McGuire, supra note 9, at 197-98; Comment, The "Passing-On" Defense in Treble
Damage Antitrust Suits, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 377, 387; Note, The Defense of "Passing-On" in Treble
Damage Suits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70 YALE L.J. 469,479 n.66 (1961). Because FED. R. Civ.
P. 22 requires complete diversity before the interpleader can be used, it would have minimal
application in this area. As a result, courts would need to rely most often on statutory inter-
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its drawbacks since the defendant may not be willing or able to deposit
with the courts the large stakes generally associated with section 4 ac-

tions;4 furthermore, such a move may be tantamount to an admission
of liability by the moving defendant.4 2 A final method could be for the

courts to hold any award in escrow, under a modified constructive trust
theory, for a statutorily determined length of time, with the award subject to diminution by the claims of interested parties who were absent

in the litigation against the antitrust defendant.43 Admittedly, none of
these suggestions is without its flaws, but the adoption of this type of
procedural framework would have the advantage of preventing multiple
liability without sacrificing the ultimate consumers' right to be compen-

sated for any injuries they have sustained as a result of a defendant's
antitrust violation, and without diminishing the enforcement benefits
inherent in section 4 litigation.

Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-State Probate
Code Discriminating in Favor of Males Violates Equal
Protection Clause
Appellant and appellee, respectively mother and father of the deceased minor, filed competing petitions in county probate court, each
seeking appointment as administrator of the child's estate. The probate
court awarded letters of administration to the father pursuant to a provision of the Idaho probate code' that gave a mandatory preference to men
over women when members of the same entitlement class apply for
appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate. 2 Appellant conpleader-28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970). Complete diversity was abolished as a requirement for statutory
interpleader by the Supreme Court in State Farm Fire &Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
41. McGuire, supra note 9, at 197-98; Note, supra note 40, at 479 n.66.
42. Note, supra note 40, at 479 n.66.
43. "A constructive trust arises when a person who holds title to property is subject to an
equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it." 5 A. ScoTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 462 (3d ed. 1967).
1. IDAHO CODE § 15-312 (1947) designates the persons who are entitled to administer an
intestate's estate by means of a priority ranking based upon relationship to the deceased. The third
group listed is the "father or mother." Section 15-314 further provides that "[o]f several persons
claiming and equally entitled [under § 15-312] to administer, males must be preferred to females,
and relatives of the whole to those of the half blood."
2. On March 12, 1971, the Idaho Legislature adopted the Uniform Probate Code, effective
July 1, 1972. Once the new code is in effect §§ 15-312 and 15-314 of the present code effectively
will be repealed; no provision in the new legislation gives a mandatory preference to males over
females as administrators of estates.
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tended that the statutory provision favoring men over women violated

the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Agreeing with
appellant, the state district court held that the challenged section unconstitutionally discriminated against women and was therefore void. The
Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court and reinstated the original order naming the father as administrator of the estate. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. The granting
of a mandatory preference to men over women, when both are members
of the same entitlement group applying for appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate, violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
In recognition of the respective roles historically performed by man

and woman within the family, English common law merged many of the
3
procedural and substantive rights of the wife into those of the husband .
The resulting female disabilities, like other vestiges of the common law,

frequently were assimilated into the laws of this country and persist
today in many fields.' Changes in the style of life resulting from modern
technology, communication, and education, however, have caused a re3. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 445.
4. A March 1970 memorandum of the Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women
lists 15 specific areas of sex discrimination:
"I. State laws placing special restrictions on women with respect to hours of work and
weightlifting on the job;
2. State laws prohibiting women from working in certain occupations;
3. Laws or practices operating to exclude women from State colleges and universities (including higher standards required for women applicants to institutions of higher learning and
in the administration of scholarship programs);
4. Discrimination in employment by State and local governments;
5. Dual pay schedules for men and women public school teachers;
6. State laws providing for alimony to be awarded, under certain circumstances, to ex-wives
but not to ex-husbands;
7. State laws placing special restrictions on the legal capacity of married women or their
capacity to establish a legal domicile;
8. State laws that require married women but not married men to go through formal procedure and obtain court approval before they may engage in an independent business;
9. Social Security and other social benefits legislation which give greater benefits to one sex
thart the other;
10. Discriminatory preferences, based on sex, in child custody cases;
!1. State laws providing that the father is the natural guardian of minor children;
12. Different ages for males and females in (a) child labor laws, (b) age for marriage, (c)
cutoff of the right to parental support, and (d) juvenile court jurisdiction;
13. Exclusion of women from the requirements of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967;
14. Special sex-based exemptions for women in selection of State juries;
15. Heavier criminal penalties for female offenders than for male offenders committing the
same crime."
116 CONG. REC. 9685 (1970). See also Note, Sex, Discrimination,and the Constitution, 2 STAN.
L. REV.691 (1950).
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evaluation of the societal roles traditionally attributed to man and
woman. Laws that discriminate on the basis of sex are now regarded by
many as anachronistic barriers, depriving women of the free exercise of
certain rights enjoyed by men.5 Although the advent of female suffrage6
and the inclusion of sex as an equal employment opportunity classification under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act7 represent significant
legislative progress in the quest for the legal equality of women, the

courts have remained unwilling to proclaim the absolute equality of the
sexes.8 Early decisions reveal underlying social and legal attitudes that

continue to constitute the basis for judicial reluctance. Concurring in an
1872 Supreme Court decision 9 denying a license to practice law to a

woman, Justice Bradley stated that the "constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood."'

0

In Muller v.

Oregon," the High Court in 1908 brought this early social position into
a legal context and in dicta established the principle that sex is a valid

basis for classification.12 Subsequent judicial reliance upon this language
without regard for the purpose of the statute in question or the reasona-

bleness of the classification has substantially stymied challenges of sexbased discrimination on equal protection grounds.' 3 Although the fourteenth amendment prohibits arbitrary, unreasonable discrimination, a
5. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1969); Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman,
The Equal Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J.
871 (1971); Cavanaugh, "A Little Dearer Than His Horse:" Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine
Personality, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 260 (1971); Crozier, Constitutionalityof
Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L. REv. 723 (1935); Gilbertson, Women and the Equal
Protection Clause, 20 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 351 (1971); Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discriminationby
Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675 (1971); Kanowitz, Constitutional
Aspects of Sex-Based Discriminationin American Law, 48 NEB. L. REv. 131 (1968); Murray &
Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discriminationand Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
232 (1965); Seidenberg, The Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in the Law Concerning
Women's Rights, 55 CORNELL L. REV.262 (1970); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971); Note,
Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection:Do We Need a ConstitutionalAmendment?, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1499 (1971); Note, Sex, Discrimination,and the Constitution,2 STAN. L. REV.691 (1950).
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to-15 (1970).
8. See Johnston & Knapp, supra note 5.
9. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
10. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
11. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upheld statute limiting work by women to 10 hours a day).
12. See id. at 421-23.
13. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upheld statute denying women a
bartender's license).
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state ordinarily can support the constitutionality of a classificatory statute by showing that the divisions created bear a "rational relationship"
to a legitimate state objective."4 When "suspect classifications" such as

race"s or national ancestry,16 or "fundamental interests" such as voting

7

or procreation"8 are involved, however, much stricter judicial scrutiny is
imposed. In such cases, the burden is placed upon the state to show a
compelling state interest in support of the discriminatory statute.1 9 Although sex-based classifications have been held invalid under the equal
protection clause by several state and federal courts, 20 the progress in

overcoming the broad language in Muller has been slow. The less demanding rational connection test was applied in most of these cases, but
at least two decisions 21 have held that sex is a suspect classification and
have imposed the stricter compelling state interest standard. Despite this

activity by lower courts, the Supreme Court has never held any form of
sex discrimination to violate the equal protection guarantee. In fact, the
Court in a recent decision summarily upheld, against an equal protection
22
challenge, South Carolina's right to operate a sex-segregated college.
The Court's continued willingness to examine the problem of sex-based
discrimination, however, was evidenced by its agreement to hear several
cases in which the issue was directly presented.Yz

14. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upheld statute prohibiting the
sale of certain articles on Sunday); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upheld statute denying
women a bartender's license).
15. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidated statute prohibiting cohabitation by an unmarried interracial couple).
16. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (imposed strict scrutiny on order
relocating Japanese-Americans during World War II).
17. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (held Virginia's poll tax
unconstitutional).
18. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidated
statute providing for sterilization of habitual criminals).
19. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1087 (1969).
For a critical appraisal of the expanding application of the compelling state interest standard see
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CAL. L. Rav. 341 (1949).
20. See, e.g., Kirstein v. University of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (recognized
right of women to attend University of Virginia at Charlottesville); Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old
Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (upheld right of women to patronize bar
formerly catering only to men); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642,243 A.2d 400 (1968) (struck
down unequal criminal sentencing for men and women).
21. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) (applied strict
scrutiny to difference in criminal sentencing based upon sex); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d
1,485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (upheld hiring of women bartenders at state-licensed bars).
22. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), affid mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
23. In addition to the present case, the Supreme Court recently has granted certiorari in 2
other state court cases involving sex discrimination: In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814
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In the instant case, the Supreme Court observed that the provision
of the Idaho probate code according different treatment to potential
administrators on the basis of sex established a classification subject to
inspection under the equal protection clause. 24 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Chief Justice Burger noted that the fourteenth amendment does
not deny states the power to treat different classes of persons in different
ways. The classification, however, must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must be based upon some difference that has a substantial relation
to the purpose of the legislation. Recognizing that the reduction of the
workload of probate courts is a legitimate state objective, the Court
nevertheless ruled that persons within a given entitlement class are similarly situated with respect to that objective, regardless of sex. The High
Court further announced that the difference in sex of competing applicants for letters of administration did not bear a rational relationship
to the state purpose that was sought to be advanced. The Court, therefore, concluded that a statute which gives preference to men over women
when persons of the same entitlement class apply for appointment as
administrator of a decedent's estate is based solely on an arbitrary discrimination prohibited by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The instant decision, as the first case in which the Supreme Court
squarely has held that sex-based discrimination violates the equal protection clause, is a significant landmark in the developing interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment. In some respects, however, the ruling represents only a qualified victory for proponents of legal equality between
the sexes. The opponents of the proposed equal rights amendment, for
example, can use the decision as support for their contention that the
guarantee embodied in the equal protection clause makes such an
amendment unncessary. More important is the Court's failure to include
sex as a suspect classification. Choosing to apply the less demanding
rational connection test, the Court declined to afford sex-based discrimi(1970), cert. grantedsub nom. Stanley v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971) (involving alleged discrimination against the male parent in awarding custody of illegitimate children); State v. Alexander,
255 La. 941, 233 So. 2d 891 (1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 936 (1971) (involving a claim that
females were systematically excluded from the grand jury which returned a rape indictment against
defendant, a male Negro).
24. The application of the equal protection clause to instances of statutory classification is
thoroughly examined by Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 19.
25. A version of the proposed amendment ensures that equality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex. H.R.J. Res. 11,
89th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1 (1965); S.J. Res. 85, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1965). For a discussion
of the proposed amendment see Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, supra note 5; Note, Sex
Discriminationand Equal Protection:Do We Need a ConstitutionalAmendment?. supra note 5.
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nation equal status with discrimination based upon race. A comparison
between sex and race as a criterion for classification, however, reveals
similarities that support the inclusion of sex as a suspect classification.
Both sex and race define large, readily identifiable classes whose members are immutably determined by accident of birth. Both classes are
subject to certain group stereotypes drawn from imputed characteristics
that, although inapplicable to many individual members of the group,
nonetheless have been employed to endorse discriminatory treatment for
the entire class. The falsity of certain racial stereotypes has been widely
recognized in recent years, and women similarly have demonstrated that
many of the characteristics attributed to females as a class are without
basis in fact. To the extent that women perform maternal functions, they
are physiologically different from men and society has an obvious interest in the protection of this vital role. Nevertheless, courts have been
reluctant to recognize that many women choose not to become wives and
mothers26 and, more importantly, that neither the status of "wife" nor
the status of "mother" has a functional basis after the birth of the child.
Individuals should not be denied equal opportunity for personal achievement by overbroad laws based upon a stereotyped conception of "womanhood." An expanded application of the equal protection clause or a
constitutional amendment prohibiting sex-based discrimination would
not preclude legislative protection of woman's role as childbearer, as
some opponents contend. Either, however, would require a shift of emphasis from the class attributes of womanhood to the functional attributes of individuals.27 Laws recognizing functions, if being performed,
rather than sex per se would permit legal protection of mothers and
homemakers while granting equal professional and personal opportunity
to women who choose careers outside the home. Even if no constitutional change is ratified, a reappraisal of sex discrimination under the
fourteenth amendment resulting in a judicial inclusion of sex as a suspect
classification undoubtedly would affect various existing laws. Alimony
based upon sex would not be permitted, but instead would be determined
by an examination of the relative income of the two parties. State labor
standards would have to apply equally to men and women. Both sexes
also would be subject to compulsory military service and jury duty, but
exemptions could be made for certain activities, such as child care and
parenthood, if based on performance of the function rather than sex. In
26.

Women made up 38% of the labor force in 1971. U.S. DEP'T OF

LABOR, WOMEN WORK-

ERS TODAY 1 (1971).

27.

For a discussion of the functional aspect of classification see Murray & Eastwood, supra

note 5, at 239.
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this respect, the present decision represents the initial step toward recog-

nition by the Supreme Court that the equal protection clause authorizes
classification by sex only when inherent sexual attributes bear a rational
functional relationship to the state objective.

Constitutional Law-Federal Pre-emption-Atomic
Energy Act Requires Exclusive Federal Regulation of
Radioactive Discharges from Nuclear Power Plants
Plaintiff, a nuclear power producer located in Minnesota, sought a
declaratory judgment that defendant, the state of Minnesota, had no
authority to regulate the release of radioactive waste materials from
plaintiff's nuclear power plant.' Minnesota's regulations were more
stringent than those imposed by the federal government, and plaintiff
contended that the development and utilization of atomic power demanded uniform policies and controls that could not be accomplished
without exclusive federal regulation. 2 Plaintiff further maintained that
Congress intended the Atomic Energy Act 3 to vest, and that the Act did
in fact vest, exclusive control over the construction and operation of
nuclear facilities in the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Minnesota
asserted, however, that the Act did not pre-empt a state's authority to
regulate the discharge of radioactive waste materials within its own
borders. Relying on the tenth amendment to the Constitution,4 Minne1. Both parties agreed that there were no disputed factual issues and stipulated the following
facts: (a) the Atomic Energy Commission issued a provisional permit to plaintiff in June, 1967,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2134(b) (1970) and the regulations contained in 10 C.F.R. § 50 (1971),
authorizing construction of a nuclear power plant located on the Mississippi River near Monticello,
Minnesota; (b) the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency issued a waste disposal permit on May
20, 1969, subject to state controls regulating the radioactive level of liquid and gaseous discharges;
(c) on January 19, 1971, the AEC issued to plaintiff a provisional operating license under which
the Monticello plant is currently operating; (d) plaintiff is acting in compliance with all federal laws
and requirements and it is not physicially impossible to comply with both state and federal regulations. The Minnesota regulations, although embracing the same area as the federal regulations, are
substantially more stringent; and (e) the Governor of Minnesota and the AEC have not entered
into any agreement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 202 1(b) (1970) that would allow Minnesota to assume
regulatory powers in controlling atomic energy.
2. Plaintiff also contended that any state regulation could lead to abuse and be detrimental
to the efforts of the AEC to promote the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. As
an overly protective reaction against the dangers presented by atomic energy utilization, states
might enact extremely strict regulations in order to preclude the use of nuclear reactors.
3. 68 Stat. 921-61 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
4. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.

1972]

RECENT CASES

sota urged that, since pollution control is essential to the health and
safety of its citizens, Minnesota should have authority to regulate such
pollution under its police powers. The federal district court concluded

that federal legislation pre-empted even concomitant state regulation, 5
and on appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, held, affirmed. The
Atomic Energy Commission has exclusive power to regulate radioactive
waste releases from nuclear power plants. Northern States Power Co.
v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).

Before Congress can pre-empt a state from exercising authority
over a field of regulation and grant exclusive regulatory control to the
federal government, the power to so act must be specifically delegated

to Congress by the Constitution.' In the absence of an express constitutional delegation, the tenth amendment reserves to the states the power
to regulate. 7 Notwithstanding these clear guidelines, conflicts have arisen
when both state and federal governments assert jurisdiction over the

same subject matter based upon separate and distinct acts of sovereignty.8 The Atomic Energy Act of 1946,1 for example, authorized complete federal pre-emption of the nuclear energy field by granting the A EC
exclusive control over the production and use of fissionable materials.'"
States have also sought to regulate, as necessary to the health and safety

of their citizens, the intrastate discharge of pollutants." Although the
5. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970).
6. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947). See also Helman, Preemption: Approaching Federal-StateConflict over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L.
,EV.43 (1967).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. X. When there is a specific delegation, however, the supremacy clause
of the Constitution is the basis for federal pre-emption. The supremacy clause provides: "This
Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the Land, and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2. See Estep,
FederalControl of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private Atomic Energy Activities,
52 MICH. L. REv. 333 (1954).
8. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (municipality's regulation of smoke emission from ships engaged in interstate commerce to protect health and
welfare of its citizens challenged on basis of federal pre-emption of regulating interstate commerce);
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (regulation of weight
of vehicles using state highways as an exercise of police power to protect state roads challenged by
interstate truckers on basis that only Congress could regulate interstate commerce).
9. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 1073, 60 Stat. 755.
10. The AEC controlled the mining of certain radioactive source material, and owned all of
the facilities that produced fissionable materials and all of the radioactive material produced.
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 1073, §§ 5(a)(l), 5(a)(2), 5(b)(1), 60 Stat. 755.
11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 22, §§ 346-51 (Supp. 1969) (Solid Waste Disposal Act); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-505 to -522 (Supp. 1969) (Connecticut Air Pollution Control Act); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 7106:111-:136, :141-:144 (Supp. 1971) (Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Control Act); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 23-25-1 to -22 (1968) (Rhode Island Clean Air Act).
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Supreme Court has acknowledged that it is the function of the judiciary
to resolve disputes arising out of such overlapping regulation,' 2 no single
formula has been found appropriate for all cases. In Florida Lime and

Avocado Growers v. Paul,3 the Court held that, when the state enactment was inconsistent with federal objectives, a state could only act up

to the point of actual conflict with federal authority. In other cases, 4
the Court recognized an express congressional declaration that the authority conferred would be exclusive as pre-emptive of any state concomitant or supplementary regulatory power. Even in the absence of an
express prohibition against dual regulation, however, some cases have
implied federal pre-emption. 15 In determining the propriety of implied
pre-emption, courts have examined the aim and intent of the statute in
question, 6 the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme 7 and the need to
achieve uniformity, 8 and the state law's position as a possible obstacle
to the purposes and objectives of Congress. 9
In recent years, the conflict between federal and state control of
nuclear power production has become increasingly difficult to resolve.
The AEC periodically has relinquished parts of its absolute control over
the operation of nuclear facilities, and states have become more actively
12. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (a court's function is to determine and
implement the full purpose and objectives of Congress).
13. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
14. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961) (state and federal concomitant regulation
of tobacco grades prohibited by Congress' declaring that control should be left to the federal
government); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1947) (concomitant regulation of grain warehouses rejected by finding contrary congressional intent).
15. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 772 (1947)
(dual state and federal regulation of labor dispute denied). See also Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926) (Federal Boiler Inspection Act precluded concomitant state regulation in that field).
16. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147-50 (1963) (Agricultural Adjustment Act's legislative history did not preclude concomitant state regulation); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1961) (Federal Tobacco Inspection Act's legislative history
precluded any state regulation of the industry). The Supreme Court traditionally has placed special
reliance upon legislative history in determining whether federal pre-emption should be implied.
17. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1956) (Communist Control Act
of 1954 completely covers that field of regulation to the exclusion of state control); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (federal legislation exclusively covers the field of grain
warehouse regulation); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,
774 (1947) (federal legislation prohibits state regulation of labor disputes through its pervasiveness).
18. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1963) (state
regulation of avocadoes upheld as not being an obstacle to uniformity of regulation in the field);
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959) (dual federal and state
regulation regarding labor/management disputes no obstacle to uniformity in the field).
19. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (state legislation that stood as an
obstacle to federal regulation held invalid).

1972]

RECENT CASES

concerned with environmental protection. In 1954, for example, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to allow limited private owner-

ship and operation of utilization facilities, 2 with the owners still being
required to comply with strict AEC licensing requirements. 2 ' In 1959,
the Act was amended again to provide procedures that authorized the
A EC to relinquish certain of its regulatory responsibilities to the states. 22
The 1959 amendments, however, specifically prohibited the Commission
from discontinuing its authority and responsibility over the construction
and operation of nuclear production and utilization facilities.3 Because
of the special hazards involved, the Act seemed to mandate continued

federal supervision over nuclear power plants and the discharge of radioactive effluents therefrom. 24 Along with these amendments, Congress
more recently has extended the states' power to regulate in the closely
related, yet formerly pre-empted, area of environmental protection.25 In

cases involving analogous concomitant state and federal regulation,
courts have been reluctant to find federal pre-emption when states have
acted under the authority of their police powers. 21 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission,7
20. Act of Aug.30, 1954,ch. 1073, § 81, 68 Stat.935 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970)).
The amendment authorized private ownership of byproduct materials and leasing of special nuclear
materials.
21. Id. For an analysis of the detailed licensing procedures see Power Reactor Dev. Co. v.
International Union of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
22. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021
(1970)). Section 2021(b) (1970) allows discontinuance of AEC authority only when the Governor
of a state and the AEC enter into an agreement to that effect. The Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, however, found that "[1]icensing and regulation of more dangerous activities-such as
nuclear reactors-will remain the exclusive responsibility of the Commission. Thus a line is drawn
between types of activities deemed appropriate for regulation by individual States at this time, and
other activities where continued AEC regulation is necessary." S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2872, 2879 (1959).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1970) provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed
to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards."
25. See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75
(1970); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-57(1) (1970); National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321-47 (1970); Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4371-74 (1970).
26. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (state law, if
compatible with the Labor Management Relations Act, may be resorted to in order to find the
rule best suited to effectuate policy of Act); Dickinson v. First Nat'l Bank, 400 F.2d 548 (5th Cir.
1968), affd., 396 U.S. 122 (1969) (upheld state law imposing restrictions on federal definition of
"branch bank").
27. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For a discussion of this case see 25 VAND. L. REv. 258
(1972).
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for example, acknowledged that Congress, through various environmental control acts, had recognized a significant state interest in protecting
the environment. Moreover, the court in Calvert Cliffs' noted that the
AEC has acknowledged this interest. Certain regulations proposed by
the Commission subsequent to the 1969 enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act would obligate holders of nuclear construction
permits to observe all applicable environmental standards imposed by
either federal or state law.38
The instant court initially found that Congress had not exceeded the
scope of its constitutionally delegated authority29 by enacting the Atomic
Energy Act and then proceeded to consider whether the Act precluded
the state regulation in question. After concluding that the Act did not
expressly pre-empt state regulation and that compliance with both the
state and federal regulations was not impossible, the court looked to the
legislative history of the Act and to the amendments to the Act to
determine whether pre-emption could be implied on those bases. Although the 1954 amendments somewhat diminished federal control over
the development of atomic energy,3 ° the court noted that the pervasive
licensing procedures that had been established effectively retained federal pre-emption of the field. Similarly, although the 1959 amendments
enabled the AEC to transfer some regulatory functions to the states, the
court found that the modifications were not intended to permit state
regulation of radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants. 31 Moreover,
the court observed that there would be no need for such formalized
transfer procedures unless the AEC otherwise had exclusive regulatory
jurisdiction. By closely examining the precise language of these amendments, the court found a clear congressional intent to pre-empt the field
of controlling radioactive waste releases from nuclear power plants. 32 As
additional support for this conclusion, the court noted that state regulation could present the possibility of overly protective action by the states.
Finally, the court reasoned that, since such national interests as common
defense, the security of the nation, and the free-flow of interstate and
28. 449F.2dat1116.
29. For a discussion of the constitutional basis for congressional regulation of public health
and safety standards see Estep & Adleman, State Control of RadiationHazards:An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41 (1961); Estep, supra note 7.
30. See Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, § 1, 53, 81, 68 Stat. 921, 930, 935 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011,2073,2111 (1970)).
31. See Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 1, 73 Stat. 688 (codified at42 U.S.C.

§ 2021(b) (1970)).
32. See Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 1, 73 Stat. 688 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(k) (1970)). For the text of 2021 (k) see note 24 supra.
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foreign commerce could be jeopardized by individual state action, federal pre-emption was necessary and should be implied.
Although the instant court's analysis of the Atomic Energy Act was
sound, the court evidenced a myopic view in reaching its decision. First,
the court's finding of implied federal preemption to the exclusion of state
police power is contrary to the test established by the Supreme Court in
FloridaLime & A vocado Growers v. Pau133 -"whether both regulations
could be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the
field. 13 4 In the instant case, the court failed to determine whether the
State regulations were unreasonable or burdensome. The Supreme Court
also has held that state police powers should not be superseded unless
an intent to pre-empt is clearly manifested by Congress'3 or unless
Congress has unambiguously mandated pre-emption.3 6 The Eighth Circuit in the instant case, however, resorted to legislative history that was
neither clear nor unambiguous in reaching its decision. Secondly, this
court disregarded the proposed regulations of the AEC,37 which provide
that atomic energy plants must conform to both state and federal regulations in order to be licensed. The AEC promulgated these regulations
under authority conferred by the 1969 National Environmental Policy
Act, 38 which encourages federal agencies to share their regulatory
authority with the states. Nevertheless, two sections 39 of the Atomic
Energy Act seem to preclude the AEC's delegating such regulatory
authority to the states; therefore the acts conflict. Although an
administrative agency's interpretation of an act is not controlling,
the AEC must have had good reason to propose this state regulation,
and the instant court should have considered these reasons in reaching
its decision. Finally, and most significantly, the instant court failed
to recognize either the express language or the congressional intent
behind recently enacted environmental protection acts.40 In each
of these acts, Congress recognized the need for more control of
environmental pollution, stressed the necessity of greater state
and federal cooperation, and used language broad enough to reach
a variety of environmental problems--including radioactive waste disposal. Consequently, it is not unexpected that sections of the environ33.
34.
35.

373 U.S. 132 (1963).
373 U.S. at 142.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).

36. 373 U.S. at 147.
37. 10 C.F.R. § 50, app. D (1971). At the time the instant case was decided, these regulations were proposed but not adopted.

38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(k), (m)(1970).
40.

See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
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mental acts and the Atomic Energy Act are inconsistent." Courts, therefore, should concern themselves not with ignoring, but with resolving the
conflicting sections by balancing federal and state interests. The federal
government has an interest in controlling atomic energy resources in
order to preserve national defense capabilities and to provide national
uniformity in the use of atomic energy. The AEC, through its specialization and expertise, can provide necessary leadership in the development
and management of nuclear power plants.42 On the other hand, states
have a pressing and legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety
of their citizens. Moreover, effective policing of a regulatory scheme may
be accomplished more efficiently on the state level, since a state may be
more responsive to local problems than a large, federal bureaucracy.
Finally, a state may choose to forego some of the salutary effects of
increased electric power in order to offer its citizens a cleaner environment. Obviously there is merit to both sides-enough merit to warrant
a closer scrutiny than the instant court provided. The problems raised
by this case are indicative of future conflicts between pre-emptive authority and remedial legislation. Congress may intentionally use broad
language in drafting remedial legislation to enhance an act's chances of
reaching a variety of related problems. Congress also should be aware
that even a well intentioned ambiguity may have uncomfortable side
effects. It should be left to Congress to cure interpretative problems that
arise, since without congressional action each problem will be litigated
separately with possibly inconsistent results. Although the judiciary
eventually may reach a solution, Congress should exercise legislative
power to circumvent the time-consuming judicial process by amending
conflicting legislation to clarify present congressional intent and the
3
allowable means to accomplish its purpose.1
41. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1970) (restricting concomitant state and federal regulation), with 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) (encouraging dual regulation).
42. One area in which federal assistance is vitally needed is in the production of electricity
by atomic energy; without this help, the current energy crisis will be much more difficult to resolve.
For an account of the energy crisis as well as proposals for its solution see Special Project, The
Energy Crisis: The Need for Antitrust Action and Federal Regulation, 24 VAND. L. REV. 705

(1971).
43. Since the preparation of this Comment, the United States Supreme Court has affirmed
the instant decision without opinion, Justices Stewart and Douglas dissenting. Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota, 40 USLW 3479 (Apr. 4, 1972).
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Corporations -Shareholder

Suits -Shareholder

May

Inspect Corporate Records Only for Proper Purpose Germane to his Economic Interest As Shareholder, Not
Merely To Further his Own Social and Political Beliefs
Petitioner shareholder,' who strongly opposed American military
involvement in Vietnam, requested respondent Honeywell, Inc., to permit him to inspect its shareholder lift so that he could communicate with
other shareholders about halting Honeywell's production of war materials. Petitioner had purchased respondent's stock solely to gain a voice
in Honeywell's affairs and thereby effectuate a change in the board of
directors that would lead to a reduction in the manufacture of war
materials. 2 When Honeywell refused to allow the requested inspection,
petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel disclosure.3 Petitioner
contended that proxy solicitation and communication with other share-

holders are in themselves proper purposes justifying inspection of the
shareholder ledger. Honeywell maintained that proper purposes must
focus on concern for investment returns and that petitioner, therefore,
had not set forth a proper purpose. The trial court dismissed the petition
and concluded that petitioner had not met the common-law prerequisite
to inspection of setting forth a proper purpose germane to his interest

as a shareholder. 4 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, held,
affirmed. A shareholder does not have the right to inspect shareholder
lists in order to communicate with other shareholders or to solicit proxi. In July 1969, after learning about Honeywell's involvement in the production of war
materials, petitioner ordered his agent to purchase 100 shares of Honeywell stock. The agent,
however, unaware of petitioner's purpose, bought the stock in the name of a family nominee. Later,
petitioner learned that he had a contingent beneficial interest in 242 shares of Honeywell stock
through a trust formed for his benefit by his grandmother. Finally, on August 11, 1969, petitioner
bought one share of stock in his own name.
2. Petitioner attended the July 3, 1969, meeting of the "Honeywell Project," an antiwar
group that sought to stop Honeywell's manufacture of munitions. Petitioner first learned about
Honeywell's government contracts for antipersonnel bombs at this time and decided to try to stop
Honeywell's participation in these activities.
3. The petition for writ of mandamus was filed on November 24, 1969. Petitioner also sought
to inspect Honeywell's records specifically relating to the manufacture of war materials in order
to familiarize himself with the extent of Honeywell's involvement so he could make stronger
arguments to other shareholders. These records were not, however, the focus of attention; the
primary issue concerned the shareholder ledger containing names and addresses.
4. Honeywell is a Delaware corporation doing business in Minnesota. On appeal, both parties
argued the question of applicable state law. The trial court applied Delaware law. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 1968). The instant court found that the test derived from common law and
was applicable in Minnesota under the authority of Sanders v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 250
Minn. 265, 84 N.W.2d 919 (1957). Thus the common-law test was properly used.
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ies for a board of directors election when the shareholder's sole purpose

is to advance his own social and political beliefs without regard to
economic effects. State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d
406 (Minn. 1971).
At common law, company shareholders have a right to inspect
corporate records in order to protect their interests as owners of the

corporation. 5 Enforcement of this right against recalcitrant management

is by writ of mandamus.' Mandamus, however, is a discretionary rem-

edy, and courts require the shareholder to justify its use by showing a
proper purpose for the inspection, in order to prevent the corporate
disruption that would be created by a shareholder roaming at will

through company records merely to satisfy some personal motive. 7 The
court, therefore, must inquire into the objectives sought by a shareholder's request to examine corporate records.8 Early state statutes embodied the common-law principles but extended them to make the
inspection right virtually absolute Because the remedy for denial of this

statutory right continued to be mandamus, however, the courts continued to rely on the discretionary nature of the remedy to enforce a shareholder's inspection demand only upon demonstration of a proper pur5. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 155 (1905) (bank shareholders cannot be
denied access to books and accounts by bank officers); State ex rel. G.M. Gustafson Co. v.
Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N.W.2d 911 (1946) (bank shareholders had right to inspect

the books for proper purposes); 5 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPOATIONS § 2214 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1967); H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES 396-97 (2d ed. 1970); ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 52, Comment (2d ed. 1971);
Note, "Proper Purpose"forInspection of CorporateStock Ledger, 1970 DuKE L.J. 393, 394-95.
6. 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 2214; Note, supra note 5, at 394 n.9, 395.
7. See, e.g., Cooke v. Outland, 265 N.C. 601, 611, 144 S.E.2d 835, 842 (1965). In Cooke, a
proper purpose was exhibited by a demand to examine bank records to determine the value of the
stock equity and the bank's financial condition and to determine whether the bank was managed
efficiently. Proper purpose has been shown in other instances. See cases cited note 12 infra. Courts
have denied mandamus when petitioner did not show a proper purpose. See cases cited note 13 infra.
8. In most instances, courts have gone beyond petitioner's demand to inspect corporate
records in order to determine the purpose behind the demand. See, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Loft,
Inc., 34 Del. 538, 156 A. 170 (1931) (although shareholder is equitable owner of corporate assets,
inspection will be allowed only when the facts, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, justify
it); Sawers v. American Phenolic Corp., 404 111.440, 89 N.E.2d 374 (1949) (shareholder must show
that he has some interest at stake or some beneficial reason for desiring the examination); State ex
rel. G.M. Gustafson Co. v. Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N.W.2d 911 (1946) (trust
company shareholder's inspection demand must be germane to his interest as shareholder).
9. E.g., Law of Mar. 22, 1929, ch. 135, § 29, [1929] Del. Laws 391 (the stock ledger
containing the names, addresses, and share ownership of all shareholders "shall . . . be open to
the examination of every stockholder"); Law of May 7, 1897, ch. 384, § 53, [1897] N.Y. Laws
314. For an in-depth discussion of the early "absolute" inspection right statutes see Newman,
Inspection ofStock Ledgers and Voting Lists, 16 Sw. L.J. 439,442-46 (1962).
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pose. 0 More recent statutes have settled this dilemma by incorporating
the common-law proper purpose concept into the statutory language."
This common-law standard has been interpreted by the courts to mean
that a shareholder, acting in good faith, has a legal right to inspect
corporate records for a specific legal purpose if that purpose is not
contrary to the interests of the corporation and is germane to the peti-

tioner's interest as a corporate shareholder.' 2 On this basis, when the
shareholder merely wanted to satisfy an idle curiosity, to harass the

company, or to obtain the information, such as shareholder lists, for his
individual business or speculative use, courts traditionally have found
the purpose to be improper.

3

In MeMahon v. Dispatch Printing Co.,

10. The development of judicial application of the law in Delaware is a typical example. See
State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 143 A. 257 (1926); Note, supra note 5,
at 394-97. See also Henry v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 196 N.Y. 302,89 N.E. 942 (1909).
ii. Note, supra note 5, at 397. For an analysis of the different state statutes see ABA MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 52,
3.02-.03 (2d ed. 1971). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220
(Supp. 1968) (any "stockholder . . . shall upon written demand under oath stating the purpose
thereof, have the right. . . to inspect for any proper purpose the corporation's stock ledger ....
A proper purpose shall mean a purpose reasonably related to such person's interest as a stockholder"); N.Y. Bus. CoRP,. LAW § 624(c) (McKinney 1963) (inspection may be denied if it is not
for a "purpose which is in the interest of a business"); id. § 624(0 ("Nothing herein contained
shall impair the power of the courts to compel the production for examination of the books and
records of a corporation"); 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 2215.1.
12. An analysis of the cases indicates that this is a fair summary of the common-law rule.
Proper purposes generally can be listed under either investigation of corporate affairs and management or proposed communication with other shareholders. For a discussion of the former category
see Sanders v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 250 Minn. 265, 84 N.W.2d 919 (1957) (inspection
of corporate records by shareholder to determine remuneration and other benefits received by
corporate officers upheld as proper purpose), noted in II VAND. L. REv. 609 (1958); State ex rel.
G.M. Gustafson Co. v. Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N.W.2d 911 (1946) (trust company
shareholder's inspection demand must be germane to his interest as shareholder); Durr v. Paragon
Trading Corp., 270 N.Y. 464, 1 N.E.2d 967 (1936) (demand by shareholders to inspect corporate
records to determine whether the officers are properly managing the corporate affairs is a sufficiently proper purpose as a matter of law); Cooke v. Outland, 265 N.C. 601, 144 S.E.2d 835 (1965)
(proper purpose was exhibited by a demand to examine bank records to determine value of the stock
equity and the bank's financial condition and to determine whether the bank was efficiently managed). For a discussion of the latter category see NVF Co. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 294 F. Supp.
1091 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (inspection of shareholder list in order to make offer to purchase equity stock
of other shareholders upheld as a proper purpose); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 43
Del. Ch. 531, 240 A.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1968); see text accompanying note 18 infra; cases cited note
15 infra.
13. See, e.g.. State ex reL Thiele v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 A. 773 (1922) (owner
of one share of stock sought the shareholder list to sell for his own profit); Sawers v. American
Phenolic Corp., 404 IIl. 440, 89 N.E.2d 374 (1949) (shareholder's purpose in requesting list was
merely to satisfy curiosity because he had not attended shareholder meetings and had not accepted
the company's offer allowing him to examine its books); Charles A. Day & Co. v. Booth, 123 Me.
443, 123 A. 557 (1924) (shareholder securities dealer bought single share of stock of several companies solely to obtain shareholder lists to use in his business); Albee v. Lamson & Hubbard Corp.,
320 Mass. 421, 69 N.E.2d 811 (1946) (petitioning shareholder failed to establish his good faith in
seeking the list). See also H. HENN, supra note 5, at 396-97.
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for example, mandamus was denied when petitioner, lacking good faith
and interest as a shareholder and consciously disregarding potential
damage to the corporation's credit, desired to enforce his right of inspection merely to prosecute a personal feud." Facilitation of proxy solicita-

tion and communication with other shareholders, however, are the traditional reasons for seeking information that have been held to be proper
purposes.' 5 In recent cases, a conflict has arisen over whether communication with other shareholders is a proper purpose in itself, or whether
the court can inquire further and deny mandamus when it finds a questionable ulterior motive for the request. In Northwest Industries, Inc.

v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,"6 petitioner, who admittedly had not bought stock
for investment purposes, was denied inspection; the court held that petitioner had failed to state the substance of its intended communication
sufficiently to indicate a reasonable relationship between the inspection's

purpose-communication with other shareholders-and petitioner's interest as a shareholder. On the other hand, in Lake v. Buckeye Steel

Castings Co., 7 the court found that communicating with other shareholders regarding the affairs of the corporation was on its face neither
an illegal, unreasonable, nor improper purpose. Therefore, unless the
corporation could prove the unreasonableness of petitioner's purpose,
the court held that mandamus would issue. In General Time Corp. v.
Talley Industries, Inc.Is proxy solicitation specifically was held to be a
purpose reasonably related to a shareholder's interest as a shareholder;
moreover, establishment of proxy solicitation as the primary purpose of
the requested inspection was held to entitle petitioner to the shareholder
14. 101 N.J.L. 470, 129 A. 425 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (petitioner sought to inspect the corporate
records to gain information to help him block the reappointment of a company officer to a state
political position).
15. Inspection has been granted to facilitate communication with other shareholders for
various reasons. See Hanrahan v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d
499 (1955) (giving other shareholders information concerning a proposed merger); Murchison v.
Alleghany Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 290, 210 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. 1960), affd mem., 210 N.Y.S.2d
975 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (shareholder sought proxies to change management). See also 5 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 5, § 2223.
16. 260 A.2d 428 (Del. 1969). In a vigorous dissent, the Chief Justice argued that the statute
gave an almost absolute right to inspect and that communication with other shareholders on
matters relating to a planned shareholder meeting is a purpose germane to petitioner's status as a
shareholder.
17. 2 Ohio St. 2d 101, 206 N.E.2d 566 (1965) (proper purpose for petitioner, 2 months after
becoming a shareholder, to seek shareholder list to communicate with other shareholders "regarding the affairs of the corporation").
18. 43 Del. Ch. 531, 240 A.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (solicitation of proxies for a slate of
directors in opposition to management is a proper purpose reasonably related to the shareholder's
interest regardless of any further purpose). See also Hanrahan v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co.,
332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d 499 (1955).
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list without further proof. Lake and General Time Corp. exemplify what
appears to be a change in approach by the courts because they provide
an indication that establishing a traditionally proper purpose, such as
an intent to communicate with other shareholders, will justify mandamus if there is no contrary showing. Furthermore, these recent decisions
indicate that a noneconomically oriented motive for demanding the right
to inspect only has indirect significance: the right to inspect has been
denied only when the court has found the traditionally improper purposes of vexation or speculative intent." An analagous situation exists
under federal law dealing with shareholder participation in corporate
decision-making. In Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC20
the court, interpreting an SEC rule dealing with the inclusion of shareholder proposals in management's annual proxy statement, 21 indicated
that a shareholder proposal to prohibit the corporation from manufacturing a certain product 22 could not be excluded23 from the proxy sent
to all shareholders merely because the proposal appeared to deal with
general social or political concerns. Thus, with respect to federal regulation of corporate activity, there is at least a suggestion that shareholders
legitimately may attempt to direct the activity of the company not only
19. Incidentally, such intent is not based on an economic concern for the corporation, but
the conclusive factor has been the existence of a traditionally improper purpose. See cases cited
note 13 supra.
20. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), noted in 24 VAND. L. REv. 387 (197 1), dismissed as moot,
92 S. Ct. 577 (1972).
21. SEC Rule 14a-8(c) permits a corporation to refuse to include shareholder proposals on
proxy statements if the proposal is concerned with, among other things, general social or political
goals or if the proposal deals with the day-to-day business of the corporation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(c) (Supp. 1971). Under the SEC rule, the corporation bears the burden of proving that the
shareholder's proposal is improper. 432 F.2d at 680. Under the common-law test applied in the
instant case, the burden of proof problem could be critical. See Note, supra note 5, at 397, 399. In
the instant case, the court ruled that the shareholder had to prove a proper purpose, but since the
case was decided on the pleadings and the deposition of petitioner, the burden of proof question
was not at issue.
22. Shareholder Medical Committee sought to amend, through the proxy method, the Dow
Company's certificate of incorporation to prohibit the corporation from manufacturing napalm.
Shareholder gave 2 reasons for opposition to its continued production: first, the Medical Committee, for humanistic reasons, was opposed to the use of napalm against other human beings in war
activities; secondly, the Medical Committee, for investment reasons, complained that, as a result
of public reaction to napalm, the company's business suffered and it was unable to recruit outstanding college graduates necessary for company growth. 432 F.2d at 662.
23. The court did not reach the merits of whether Dow could refuse to include this proposal
under the SEC rule but remanded the matter to the SEC for a complete explanation concerning
why it allowed Dow to exclude the proposal from its proxy statement. Id. at 676. The court
recognized that the concept of corporate democracy underlying the SEC's proxy rules meant that
the nature of the company's business was a proper topic for shareholder concern and discussion,
including the possibility that the corporation should manufacture products more socially useful but
perhaps less profitable. Id. at 681.
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for its fiscal consequences but for its social and political implications as
well.

In the instant decision, the court recognized that neither animosity
toward management nor a desire to gain control of the corporation in
order to improve its economic position would be improper purposes for

inspection of corporate records. In addition, the court conceded that
obtaining information for use in an election of directors is normally a
proper purpose. The court, however, rejected the argument that a mere
desire to communicate with other shareholders is per se a proper purpose,24 and, using the McMahon decision as its basis, the court imposed
the additional requirement that in order to inspect shareholder lists, the
shareholder must show that he has a proper purpose for the subsequent

communication with other shareholders.25 In effect, the court held that
it could scrutinize the motive underlying petitioner's desire to solicit
proxies and determine whether that motive itself was proper. The court
noted that the right to inspect corporate records can be a powerful
weapon in corporate warfare and extremely disruptive to normal corporate functions;26 consequently, in order to protect the corporation from
any single shareholder's burdensome actions, inspection rights must be
limited to purposes which advance the shareholder's interest as a shareholder. The court then found that petitioner had no economic interest
in the corporation's activities2 and that he intended solely to impress his
own social and political views on management and other shareholders.2
24. The court cited Lake v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 101, 206 N.E.2d 566
(1965), as an example illustrating this point.
25. This is not very novel when compared to the decision in Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 260 A.2d 428 (Del. 1969), unless the latter can be explained as a mere procedural
requirement. See Note, supra note 5, at 403. It is novel if based on McMahon.
26. "Because the power to inspect may be the power to destroy, it is important that only
those with a bona fide interest in the corporation enjoy that power." 191 N.W.2d at 410. The
court's analogy seems irrelevant to the facts as stated. Nowhere does the court indicate that
petitioner was motivated by an intention to disrupt the corporation's business.
27. The court made specific reference to the "quite tenuous" nature of petitioner's stock
holding, see note I supra, and cited two 65-year-old cases which recognized that courts will not
compel inspection for "insignificant" equity ownership. 191 N.W.2d at 411. The Model Business
Corporation Act allows any shareholder who has been a holder of record for at least 6 months or
who owns at least 5% of all outstanding shares of the corporation to exercise the inspection right.
ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 52 (2d ed. 1971). Minnesota and 8 other states, however,
allow inspection by any shareholder. Id. § 52,
3.03(3). The point was not elaborated on in the
instant case.
28. The court, using the familiar "floodgates" argument, reasoned that if this relief were
granted, anyone favoring a political or social policy different from the company's could secure a
writ, deluging the company with a rash of spurious efforts to engage in a proxy fight. The validity
of this argument presupposes 2 conditions that, in light of common-law and court decisions, appear
to be erroneous: first, that courts will be unable to recognize bad-faith efforts at simple corporate
harassment; secondly, that the management rather than the owners are the only ones who can decide
what line of business the company should undertake. See 432 F.2d at 681.
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The court finally held that, since petitioner did not have a bona fide
investment interest relevant to his role as a shareholder, he had not
shown a proper purpose and thus could not inspect respondent Honeywell's records to obtain a list of shareholders. 2
The standard enunciated in the instant decision significantly re-

stricts established common-law rights derived from the concept of shareholder ownership of corporations. The decision by the Minnesota Su-

preme Court to censor the ulterior motive behind what always has been
considered a proper purpose is clearly a departure from the accepted
common-law rule. Communication with other shareholders in order to
elect a new board of directors conventionally has been held to be a
proper purpose justifying protection of the shareholder's right to inspect
the shareholder ledger and has not been qualified by the requirement that

the intended communication be concerned with the corporation's financial status. The instant court's failure to follow this view may be partially explained by the discretionary nature of the mandamus remedy,
which retains this nature even when embodied in a statute. If a mere

allegation that petitioner seeks to inspect the shareholder ledger to communicate with other shareholders about changing the board of directors
would elicit the necessary judicial remedy, it would appear that simple
repetition of this formula by petitioner would make the inspection right
absolute. In the instant case, the court exercised its discretion by looking
beyond the claimed purpose to conclude that the underlying motivation

was not proper.30 This approach, however, appears inconsistent with
prior decisions. In the past, courts have not inquired behind an allegedly
proper purpose that they have accepted as valid, and the instant court
gave no indication that it did not accept petitioner's purpose of communicating with other shareholders as valid. 3' Furthermore, courts have
29. The Medical Committee decision was distinguished because petitioner there, unlike the
instant case, did express an investment interest as part of its concern. The instant court referred to
dicta in Medical Committee indicating that management could not use its position to require the
company to pursue certain activities according to management's social and political philosophy.
432 F.2d at 681. Analogizing to the instant case, the court stated that an "outsider with no
economic concern for the corporation" could not impose his own social convictions on Honeywell.
191 N.W.2d at 412 n.7. The analogy is questionable when a company owner is called an "outsider."
30. See Newman, supra note 9, at 459.
31. The court did not challenge the veracity or sincerity of petitioner's allegation that he
wanted to communicate with other shareholders, thus allowing the inference that this was his
primary purpose. The court accepted the good faith of the petitioner but tied his good faith purely
to his advocacy of his views. Adopting trial-court dicta, the instant court concluded that this was
not the proper forum for petitioner to air his social and political views, regardless of good faith,
and that petitioner did not want to engage in a bona ide proxy fight to take over control of the
company.
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never explicitly required that a proper purpose for inspection be integrated with an investment concern on the part of the petitioners. The
more recent cases, particularly the Lake and General Time decisions,
indicate that courts, in applying the common-law test to the issue of
inspection rights, are inclined to accept petitioner's stated purpose when
he is not motivated by an obviously improper purpose. State courts
recently have demonstrated more sympathy to the ideas of corporate
democracy and greater shareholder participation in the business of the
corporation. This trend is paralleled by federal court interpretations of
the Securities and Exchange Commission rules dealing with shareholder
32
proposals in the annual corporate proxy statement.
The instant decision severely impairs the fundamental principle of
the common law that shareholders are the equitable owners of a corporation. 33 The thrust of the decision, in effect, is to deny to a shareholder
the exercise of an ownership right-inspection of the shareholder
ledger-unless he is motivated by a concern for the value of his investment in the company. The impact of the instant holding, is somewhat
diluted, however, because it is a relatively simple matter to show a fiscal
concern. By the logic of the instant case, petitioner could have argued
successfully that, in addition to his humanistic concern, he wanted
Honeywell to cease making war materials because it damaged the company's goodwill, 34 because reliance on war production, particularly at a
time when American involvement in the Vietnam war is steadily decreasing, is not a sound economic policy, and because the company should
concentrate on manufacturing products for a more stable peacetime
economy. It is possible that the instant decision requires recitation of a
formula showing that the petitioner also was concerned for his investment. Whether a corporation is financially stable and profitable depends
on the policies followed by the corporation regarding its products. These
policies are formulated by the board of directors, but the shareholders
have the ultimate decision on the make-up of the board. Corporate
policy, therefore, must be a matter for shareholder concern and a proper
subject for shareholder discussion. Corporate policies, moreover, are not
restricted merely to questions of profit and loss. The instant court failed
to recognize that shareholders often are equally concerned with the social
and political implications of their corporation's activities. For example,
32. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970); text
accompanying note 20 supra.
33. "A corporation is run for the benefit of its stockholders and not for that of its managers." SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 517 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847
(1948).
34. This was petitioner's tactic in Medical Committee. See note 22 supra.
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although a proxy battle to force General Motors to manifest greater
sensitivity to public-interest issues 35 failed for lack of shareholder support, General Motors responded to this challenge by appointing a black
leader to its board of directors and by creating a public policy review
3
committee composed of members of the board?.
In addition, many other
corporations, in both their shareholder reports and their advertisements,
are publicizing corporate efforts to combat poverty and pollution.3 7
Under the present status of the law, a shareholder who desires to change
his company's participation in what he deems a socially detrimental
activity has two choices if he seeks to make the change through consultation with other shareholders. First, he can request that his proposal be
included in the company's annual proxy statement, in which he is limited
to a one hundred-word statement in support of his proposal.38 Management is not so limited. Corporations generally have resisted shareholderoriginated proposals for change, but the Medical Committee decision 39
and present corporate sensitivity to social issues may allow the shareholder to succeed in at least bringing the issue before other shareholderowners. 40 Secondly, he may try to exercise his right of inspection to
35. "Campaign GM, the Campaign to Make General Motors Responsible," which was
formed in late 1969, used proxy machinery and annual meetings in an effort to focus investors'
attention on issues of public interest. At the 1970 General Motors shareholders' annual meeting,
Campaign GM sought to introduce 2 resolutions: first, to add to the board of directors 3 new
members who would be public-interest oriented; and secondly, to add a Shareholders Committee
for Corporate Responsibility to gather facts and make recommendations concerning the corporation's role in modern society and possible means of achieving a proper balance between the interests
of shareholders, employees, consumers, and the general public. For an extensive analysis of the first
2 phases of Campaign GM by a law professor who participated in the project see Schwartz, The
Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1971);
Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals:Co-Existence with Society, 60 Go. L.J. 57 (1971).
36. Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-Existence with Society, supra note 35, at
59-60.
37. The trend is particularly noticeable with General Motors (controlling automobile emissions), Proctor & Gamble (minimizing pollution caused by soaps and detergents), and the Chase
Manhattan Bank (aiding black-owned small businesses).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (Supp. 1971).
39. 432 F.2d 659 (1970). It is interesting to note that the Securities and Exchange Act, upon
which the Medical Committee decision was based, evinces a legislative intent to give shareholders
a more direct voice in the governing of the corporation. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy
Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, supra note 35, at 436-51. On the other hand, the common
law, upon which state decisions rely, is aimed primarily at protecting the shareholder's beneficial
ownership of the corporate assets. See N. LATTIN, Tim LAW OF CORPORATIONS 348 (2d ed. 1971);
Note, supra note 5, at 394.
40. An inference from the Medical Committee decision is that although SEC Rule 14a-8(c)
will allow management to reject a shareholder proposal for the proxy statement if the proposal deals
with general social or political goals, a proposal to make a specific change in the company's
operations would not fall under this disqualification. Nonetheless, the proposed action must notinterfere with the day-to-day operations of the company because a proposal that would result in
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obtain other shareholders' names in order to communicate personally
with them. Among the states that have dealt with the inspection right,
the trend 41 indicates that a shareholder may be able to enforce the right
if he alleges a traditionally proper purpose. 42 Unless the instant decision
is either distinguished or overruled, however, it will stand as an obstacle
in the way of a corporate owner with a good-faith concern who seeks to
discuss with other co-owners the possibility of changing a specific activity of their company.

Criminal Law -Information-Persons Arrested Without
Warrant and Accused by Direct Information Have a
Right to Prompt Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause for Arrest
Plaintiffs' brought a class action in federal district court seeking to
enjoin defendant law enforcement officials 2 from failing to provide perinterference could also be denied access to the proxy statement under the same SEC rule. 432 F.2d
at 680. For an analagous situation that occurred 20 years earlier see Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97
F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (management's refusal to include shareholder's proposal that "management consider the advisability of abolishing the segregated seating system in the south" upheld).
Had the shareholder specifically proposed that Greyhound stop segregated seating on its own buses
in the South, the decision might have been different.
41. Cf. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 43 Del. Ch. 531, 240 A.2d 755 (Sup. Ct.
1968); Lake v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 101, 206 N.E.2d 566 (1965); text
accompanying notes 17-18 supra. Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 260 A.2d 428 (Del.
1969) (inspection denied because petitioner failed to show a reasonable relationship between inspection's purpose and petitioner's interest as shareholder), has been distinguished because it merely
indicates the proper form in which a demand for inspection should be made under the state statute.
Note, supra note 5, at 403.
42. If he succeeds in obtaining the inspection right, however, the shareholder still may be
unable to copy the list and communicate with other shareholders because of the astronomical
expense of such an undertaking. Campaign GM concluded that the cost for one first-class mailing
to each shareholder listed in the 133 large volumes of the General Motors shareholder ledger would
have cost nearly $100,000. This was based upon a first-class postage rate of 6 cents and excluded
the cost of copying the list. Schwartz, The Public-InterestProxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign
GM, supra note 35, at 426,493.
1. Plaintiffs were incarcerated in the Dade County, Florida, jail at the time the instant suit
was filed. Three of them alleged that they remained incarcerated because their poverty did not allow
them to post bail. See note 4 infra. The fourth was charged with robbery, a crime punishable in
Florida by life imprisonment, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 813.011 (1965), and therefore was not entitled
to bail under the Florida constitution. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
2. Defendants were the state attorney, sheriffs, police chiefs, justices of the peace, and judges
of small claims courts in Dade County. These officials were sued in their official capacities as
individuals charged with the responsibility of administering the system under which plaintiffs were
incarcerated.
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sons held in pretrial detention preliminary hearings before a magistrate
to determine probable cause for their arrests. Each plaintiff had been

arrested without a warrant and incarcerated prior to the filing of a direct
information by the state attorney without the review of a committing
magistrate. 3 Plaintiffs contended that this failure to provide immediate
preliminary hearings before a judicial officer to determine the probable
cause for their arrests violated both the probable cause provision of the
fourth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-

ment.4 Defendants maintained that a direct information filed by a state
3. The instant court commented that "[a] person may be charged with a crime in Dade
County, Florida, in one of five ways:
"(1)
A police officer witnesses the commission of a crime, places the accused under arrest and
takes him to jail. Sometime between 24 hours and two weeks later the arresting officer files a sworn
affidavit with the office of the state attorney who, then files a direct information and issues a capias
against the defendant.
"(2) A police officer conducts an investigation of an alleged criminal offense, decides he has
sufficient evidence to arrest, and places the defendant in jail. The arresting officer then goes to the
state attorney with his affidavit and a direct information is filed against the defendant by the state
attorney.
"(3) A police officer conducts an investigation but takes the case to the state attorney before
making the arrest and, after issuance of the direct information, arrests the defendant and places
him in jail.
"(4) A police officer conducts an investigation, presents the matter by affidavit to a justice of
the peace, who issues a warrant for arrest and conducts a preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause as to the commission of the alleged crime. The defendant is released if no probable cause is
found to exist.
"(5) The results of an investigation are submitted by the state attorney to the grand jury, which
determines probable cause and returns an indictment to a judge. After review, the judge either issues
the arrest warrant and causes the indictment to be filed or dismisses the charge." 332 F. Supp. at
1109-10. Although procedures (1) through (3) are all under attack in the instant suit, it is not
absolutely clear from the opinion whether plaintiffs were arrested before or after the filing of
informations. The strong inference is, however, that the arrests came first. The opinion states that
in addition to the probable delay of 24 hours to 2 weeks before the arresting officer's affidavit is
sworn, there is a delay of 24 to 72 hours plus weekends before the information is filed with the
clerk of the trial court, and an average delay of 10 to 15 days from the time the arresting officer
appears until the time defendant is arraigned. Thus an accused can spend 11 to 29 days in jail before
arraignment without a preliminary hearing.
4. The due process allegation was contained in Count I of the complaint. Count II alleged
that plaintiffs were denied equal protection of the law in that arresting officers often processed cases
through a justice of the peace, who conducts a preliminary hearing for probable cause, rather than
through the state attorney, as was done in this case. The complaint argued that such discretion on
the part of the police creates an arbitrary and unreasonable classification of arrestees-those who
get a preliminary hearing and those who do not. Count IIIalleged that the setting of a monetary
bail bond as a condition for release unreasonably creates a classification based solely on wealth,
therefore also violating plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the law. The court held that its ruling
on Count I rendered resolution of Count II unnecessary, and the court dismissed the allegation in
Count II I by saying that plaintiffs' confinement was the result of setting bail after considering only
factors such as the severity of the crime, plaintiffs' ties to the community, past criminal records,
and financial resources. Consequently, the bonds were not set in excess of the amount the judicial
officer deemed necessary to secure plaintiffs' appearance at trial.
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attorney was a constitutionally acceptable procedure for validating arrest and pretrial detention, and that the mere failure to provide a preliminary hearing did not amount to a violation of any constitutional right.
Upon plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, held, judgment for
plaintiffs. Use of the direct information to detain for trial persons arrested without warrants violates the fourth and fourteenth amendments
by failing to provide a prompt hearing before a judicial officer to determine probable cause for the arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp.
1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
Of the several methods by which a person may be formally accused
and brought to trial for the commission of a crime, by far the most
common are indictment or presentment by a grand jury and information by a public prosecutor. An indictment is normally initiated by a
prosecutor who submits a written accusation of a crime to the grand
jury. If the latter finds probable cause that the person accused has
committed a crime, it returns a true bill to the criminal court for further
action. The method of presentment is identical except that the true bill
is drawn up and returned by the grand jury upon its own discovery of
probable criminal activity. Unlike either an indictment or a presentment,
an accusation by information is a procedure whereby the prosecutor
himself determines the necessary probable cause, draws up a formal
accusation, and files it with the criminal court for further action. 5 Although the object of the formal accusation is to inform the accused of
the charge against him so that he can prepare his defense, its existence
obviously presupposes that a valid determination of probable cause for
the accusation has been made. Since the fourth amendment' has been
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment 7 and
has been construed as speaking of arrest warrants as well as search
warrants. 8 a constitutional question can arise concerning the validity of
the determination of probable cause made in any of the three accusatory
processes outlined if the formal accusation is used as the sole basis for
the issuance by the prosecutor of a capias, or writ of arrest. There is an
5. These comments on the nature of the indictment, the presentment, and the information
are necessarily very generalized, the processes being almost entirely dependent upon local constitutional, statutory, or procedural rules, and are intended merely to point out their basic differences.
For a detailed summary of the mechanics of a criminal prosecution see L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W.
LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3-12 (3d ed. 1969).
6. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
by Oath or affirmation ..
7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
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even greater problem concerning the fourth amendment requirement of
a valid determination of probable cause when an accused has been arrested without a warrant and detained before the return of an indictment

or presentment or before the filing of an information.9 The satisfaction
of this requirement is expressly provided for on the federal level by
2
statute's and procedural rule," and by similar methods in most states,
which prescribe the use of a preliminary hearing on probable cause
before a magistrate or other judicial officer. The accused is present at
such hearings, and, because the proceeding sometimes is used as a discovery device, it is conducted in an adversary manner. 3 Thus a valid
determination of probable cause is a constitutional concern during each
of two distinct periods of pretrial detention: the period subsequent to the
filing of the formal accusation, and the period prior thereto when an
accused has been arrested without a formal accusation having been
filed."4 As to the former period, the validity of the information procedure
of determining probable cause has been seriously questioned. In 1884,
the Supreme Court held in Hurtado v. California5 that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment did not require a grand jury indictment, guaranteed by the fifth amendment to federal defendants accused
of serious crimes, in a state felony prosecution when state law provided
for a proceeding by information.' 6 Twenty-nine years later, in Lemn
9. Virtually all jurisdictions employ procedures by which warrantless arrests may be made
by an officer in certain situations. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15 (Supp. 1971).
10. The Federal Magistrates Act § 303, 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1970).
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.
12. The relevant Florida statutes, for example, are as follows: "When arrest by a warrant
occurs in the county where the alleged offense was committed and the warrant issued, the officer
making the arrest shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before the magistrate
who issued the warrant or, if the magistrate is absent or unable to act, before the most accessible
magistrate in the same county." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.06 (Supp. 1971). "A peace officer making
an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the
most accessible magistrate in the same county and shall make a complaint stating the facts constituting the offense for which the person was arrested." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.23 (Supp. 1971).
13. See, e.g., Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
944 (1965).
14. Another important question arising in this context is how much time may elapse before
the probable cause determination must be made. State and federal statutes generally require that
all arrestees be taken before a magistrate "without unreasonable delay," either to make an immediate determination of probable cause or to set a date for a preliminary hearing. An unreasonable
delay in holding the hearing, usually defined by statute as a certain maximum number of days after
arrest, normally will require the release of the arrestee. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1970); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 907.045 (Supp. 1971).
15. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
16. The Supreme Court has never ruled that the right to a grand jury indictment in a state
prosecution is a "fundamental" one. Thus it is not guaranteed to all defendants under the holding
of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). This case held that the right to counsel was one of the
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Woon v. Oregon,17 the Court relied on Hurtado in upholding a state
procedure through which an accused could be proceeded against by
information without an examination by a magistrate of probable cause.
The opinion, by way of dictum, said that in the absence of an indictment,
the state was not required to provide a preliminary hearing during the
period prior to the filing of the information.', Similarly, many lower
federal courts have ruled that there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing on the probable cause for an arrest, at least when the issue
arises after conviction or after an indictment has been returned.' These
decisions are predicated on the theory that since a preliminary hearing
is not a critical stage of the criminal process and since a subsequent
indictment effectively resolves the issue of probable cause, failure of the
state to provide a preliminary hearing is not a denial of due process.
State courts also have refused to view the preliminary hearing as a
constitutional requirement. 20 There remains, however, the question
fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and was
therefore available to defendants in all jurisdictions. See 42 WASH. L. REv. 903 (1967).
17. 229 U.S. 586 (1913).
18. Id.at 590.
19. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971) (unreasonable delay in bringing defendant before magistrate may be false imprisonment under state law, but does not rise to status of
denial of due process); Murphy v. Beto, 416 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1969) (preliminary hearing before
magistrate is not a federal constitutional right that, if denied, requires petitioner's release on habeas
corpus); Kulyk v. United States, 414 F.2d 139, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The right under the federal
rules to be promptly taken before a magistrate has not been given constitutional status and has
not been applied to persons in state custody"); McCoy v. Wainwright, 396 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1968)
(petitioner not deprived of due process simply because not afforded a preliminary hearing in state
prosecution); Worts v. Dutton, 395 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1968) (no federal constitutional right to
preliminary hearing in state court because not a critical stage of proceeding); Kerr v. Dutton, 393
F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1968) (commitment hearing not critical stage of state proceeding, so denial of
counsel therein not unconstitutional); Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1968) (7-month
detention prior to trial without preliminary hearing is not grounds for reversal of conviction because
hearing is for determining probable cause, and, because defendant could lose no rights that would
prejudice his later defense, it is not per se a critical stage of criminal proceeding); King v. Wainwright, 368 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1966) (preliminary hearing not essential to due process of law, and
does not affect validity of conviction). For similar holdings in and outside of the Fifth Circuit see
United States v. Milano, 443 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. La Pera, 443 F.2d 810
(9th Cir. 1971); Collins v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1971); Ramirez v. Arizona, 437 F.2d
119 (9th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Smith, 435 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1970); Barber v. Arkansas, 429
F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1970); Via v. Perini, 415 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Conway,
415 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1969); Joyce v. Cox, 315 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Va. 1970).
20. Anderson v. State, 241 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1970) (denial of preliminary hearing not prejudicial when later grand jury indictment mooted issue of probable cause); Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235
So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970) (preliminary hearing not a step in due process; not a prerequisite to prosecution or to filing of information or indictment); Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965)
(preliminary hearing is not a critical stage, and prosecution may be initiated regardless of whether
it is held and regardless of whether probable cause is found); Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264 (Fla.
1962) (preliminary hearing is neither a step in the due process of law nor a prerequisite to filing an
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whether an information, when filed, validly resolves the issue of probable
cause for a subsequent arrest or cures the lack of a preliminary hearing
for one arrested and detained prior to its filing, especially when the
detention is for an appreciable length of time. Hurtado and Lem Woon
have been recently interpreted as meaning that since the use of a direct

information is constitutional, then a fortiori a state attorney must be
competent to determine probable cause for arrest. 21 Ocampo v. United
States,22 decided a year after Lem Woon, lent support to this theory by

holding the determination of probable cause to be a quasi-judicial function capable of being vested in a prosecutor. On the other hand, there
have been recent indications that a direct information filed by a prosecutor may be valid only if it is based upon a determination of probable
cause by a "neutral and detached" magistrate.2Y The Supreme Court,
in Giordenello v. United States2 4 for example, construed Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure 3 and 4 as requiring judicial determination of
probable cause in the issuance of an arrest warrant, and there is a strong
indication that this construction was based on principles derived from
the Constitution rather than from the Federal Rules.2 In an analogous
area, the Court has ruled that only a neutral and detached magistrate
may determine probable cause for the issuance of a valid search warrant,2 and that such a warrant issued by a state attorney general acting
in his dual capacity as a justice of the peace is invalid per se when he is
information); accord, Lovell v. State, 250 So. 2d 915 (Fla. App. 1971); Maxwell v. Blount, 250
So. 2d 657 (Fla. App. 1971); Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. App. 1971); Bullard v. Smith,
225 Ga. 416, 169 S.E.2d 329 (1969); People v. Shastal, 26 Mich. App. 347, 182 N.W.2d 638 (1970);
Allred v. State, 187 So. 2d 28 (Miss. 1966); State v. War, 38 N.J. Super. 201, 118 A.2d 553 (1955);
Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 129 S.E.2d 22 (1963); Crouse v. State, 384 P.2d 321 (Wyo.
1963).
21. State v. Kanistanaux, 68 Wash. 2d 652, 414 P.2d 784 (1966); see 42 WASH. L. REV.903
(1967).
22. 234U.S.91 (1914).
23. Kinnaird v. State, 251 Ind. 506, 242 N.E.2d 500 (1968), noted in 45 IND. L.J. 56 (1969).
In the comment it is noted that a state court, confronted with statutes allowing direct informations
and a constitutional provision identical to that of the fourth amendment, felt constrained to rule
that a proper arrest warrant could not be issued without some kind ofjudicial sanction.
24. 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
25. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 n.3 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357
U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958).
26. See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (subpoena duces tecum, while invalid
as search warrant on other grounds, is also invalid as search warrant because issued by district
attorney who is not a neutral and detached magistrate); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948) (the protection afforded by the fourth amendment consists of the requirement that a neutral
and detached magistrate, rather than the police, make the inference of probable cause prior to a
search); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue search warrants are to be preferred over the hurried actions
of police officers who may happen to make arrests).
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also actively in charge of conducting the investigation of the case. 2
Focusing directly on the preliminary hearing, the Supreme Court recently held, in Coleman v. Alabama,2 8 that a state hearing on the issues
of bail and probable cause for submitting a case to the grand jury is

indeed a critical stage in the criminal process, at least insofar as there is
a necessity that the defendant be afforded counsel. Finally, two recent

circuit court decisions in the District of Columbia, Cooley v. Stone2 and
Brown v. Fauntleroy'3 1 although dealing with juvenile defendants, have
expressly held that the right to a preliminary hearing is a constitutional
one.
After establishing its jurisdiction over the state criminal procedures
in question,31 the instant court turned to the primary issue of whether a
person who is arrested and held for trial upon an information filed by a

state attorney is entitled to a hearing before a judicial officer on the
question of probable cause. Examining two Supreme Court cases relied
32
upon by defendants, Hurtado v. California and Lem Woon v. Oregon,3
27. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Justice Black's dissent argues that
there need be no "little trial" by a neutral magistrate before the actual trial, and that the fourth
amendment does not disqualify the state attorney from issuing the warrant. Id. at 493 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
28. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
29. 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
30. 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
31. Defendants had argued that the court had no jurisdiction, on the basis of the Federal
Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), which states that "[a] court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments," and on the basis of several recent Supreme Court cases-Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S.
216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v.
Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971). The court replied that the relief specifically precluded under the statute is the enjoining
of a state prosecution, or a declaratory judgment with the same effect, and that, moreover, in each
of the above-cited cases the plaintiff had asked that a state criminal law statute be declared
unconstitutional. In the present case plaintiffs only asked for "a declaration of procedural rights
and an injunction from the continued denial thereof." 332 F. Supp. at 1111. This situation is
distinguishable, therefore, from those proscribed by Younger and § 2283. The court then went
further, saying that if necessary the case can be construed as one of the exceptions recognized by
Younger in which a federal court can take jurisdiction if the facts show "a 'great and immediate'
'irreparable injury' other than the 'cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a
single criminal prosecution,'" and an injury which cannot be eliminated simply by an individual's
defense against his own criminal prosecution. 332 F. Supp. at 1111. The court cited the following
cases for the proposition that Florida consistently has denied the right asserted, thus making the
injury irreparable: Anderson v. State, 241 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1970); Sangarce v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d
729 (Fla. 1970); Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965); Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d
264 (Fla. 1962).
32. I10 U.S. 516 (1884).
33. 229 U.S. 586 (1913).
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the court found neither case controlling. The Hurtado case, holding that
a determination of probable cause by a grand jury indictment was not
required for a state felony prosecution, was not controlling because the
Court there assumed that, prior to the filing of an information, probable
cause would have been determined by a committing magistrate.34 The
court then distinguished Lem Woon, noting that its legal question bore
on the validity of the information itself and not on the constitutionality
of the pretrial detention. Similarly, the court distinguished several other
cases cited by the defense for the proposition that there was no due
process right to a preliminary hearing. Recognizing the holdings of these
cases, the court found that the issue in each was the validity of the trial
and conviction as affected by the absence of a preliminary hearing, and
not the validity of the pretrial detention itself.35 The distinctive issue of
the instant suit was viewed by the court as being the validity not only of
a present confinement, but also of a recurring part of a prosecutorial
system that permits incarceration of an accused by information without
a determination of probable cause by a magistrate. Addressing this
issue, the court found that the basic due process right under the fourteenth amendment is the opportunity to be heard3 within a reasonable
time and in a proper manner.37 Moreover, an individual's freedom from
unreasonable seizure and from deprivation of liberty without due process
of law depends on judicial safeguards against the arbitrary power of the
police and the prosecutor. 3 The court determined that a preliminary
hearing satisfies these requirements. On the other hand, a nonwarrant
arrestee who has been proceeded against by information is given neither
the opportunity to be heard nor the judicial safeguard provided by an
independent determination of probable cause by a disinterested third
party. The court, therefore, concluded that the due process clause of the
34. "[W]e are unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand
jury of the proceeding by information, after examination andcommitment by a magistrate,certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to
the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law.'
(Emphasis added.) 110 U.S. at 53[8]." 332 F. Supp. at 1112.
35. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Murphy v. Beto, 416 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1969);
McCoy v. Wainwright, 396 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1968); Worts v. Dutton, 395 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1968);
Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1968); Kerr v. Dutton, 393 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1968);
King v. Wainwright, 368 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1966). Another case cited in the instant opinion,

Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), did not consider the validity of a conviction,
but the instant court found the Anderson facts analogous to those in the foregoing post-conviction
cases. In Anderson, plaintiffs were at the time of suit free pending trial, so the court in effect was
being asked, as in the cases above, to grant relief from an already terminated deprivation of rights.
36. See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).

37. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552 (1965).
38.

See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1943).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25

fourteenth amendment requires a preliminary judicial hearing within a

reasonable time after an accused has been deprived of his freedom. 39
Noting the Cooley40 and Brown 4' decisions and their requirement of a
probable cause hearing, the court additionally concluded that the fourth

amendment probable cause requirement, which applies to arrest warrants42 and is applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment,43 demands that plaintiffs be afforded such a

judicial hearing. Accordingly, the court ordered that plaintiffs be given
an immediate hearing and that defendants submit a plan whereby each
subsequent arrestee will be assured of a similar hearing.

The holding in the instant case is limited on its face to requiring
that a judicial probable cause hearing be afforded in all cases in which
prosecution is to be upon direct information. 4 Although the opinion
may appear to deal only with that period of pretrial detention prior to

the actual filing of the information, the court's holding that the necessity
of a preliminary hearing is based directly upon rights under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments makes it clear that even the filing of the

information will not obviate that necessity. Consequently, state law enforcement officials no longer will be able to incarcerate an accused, or
exact bail from him, before the filing of an information without provid-

ing him a prompt preliminary hearing. 5 Previously, the practice of incarcerating an accused for a period of time before filing the information
39. The court noted in passing the following important situations outside of criminal law
that, in order to comply with due process, require probable cause hearings before a state can take
action against a person or his property: "It has been held that a hearing must be given before a
drivers license and vehicle registration can be suspended, Bell v.Burson, 402 U.S. 535. . .(1971);
Salkay v. Williams, 445 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1971); before prohibiting the sale of liquor to an
individual for one year, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433. . .[(1971)]; before termination
of welfare payments (even though a subsequent hearing was afforded), Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 . . . (1970); before garnishment of wages (even though there was a subsequent trial), Snidach
[sic] v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 . . .(1969); before a thirty day suspension from a
public school, Williams v. Dade County School Board, 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.l'7 1); before refusal
of admission to public hospital staff, Sosa v. Board of Managers, 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971);
and before termination of employment on college faculty, Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1970)." 332 F. Supp. at 1113-14.
40. 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
41. 442 F.2d838 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
42. See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
43. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44. The court also holds that the preliminary hearing must be held "within a reasonable time
of arrest." 332 F. Supp. at 1116. The court, however, does not deal directly with the question of
what is a "reasonable time" other than to conclude that the particular plaintiffs involved were
entitled to an immediate hearing. See generally note 14 supra.
45. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.045 (Supp. 1971) requires a mandatory hearing for a defendant
charged by indictment or information after he has been in custody for more than 30 days.
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had been permitted to allow the gathering of enough evidence to go
forward with a case. Despite strong judicial warnings, this practice had
continued until the instant case." Now, before a suspect is arrested, or
held for any length of time, the prosecutor will have to produce enough
evidence to show probable cause. Not only will this requirement better
protect persons from unwarranted arrests, but it also will afford those
arrested a speedier process of justice, and prompt release if no probable
cause is found to exist.4 7 Although the holding in the instant case is
limited to criminal actions involving the use of an information, its reasoning appears to be applicable to situations in which either the indictment or the presentment is involved. If one accused by information has
a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing on probable cause, why
should one accused by indictment or presentment not also have such a
constitutional right? Notwithstanding the express constitutional provision for the grand jury procedure,4" the neutrality and propriety of the
indictment have been questioned by some,49 and it is obvious that both
state and federal indictment procedures"' have defects similar to those
of the information procedure. For example, the return of an indictment
against one already in custody has generally been regarded as obviating
the necessity for a preliminary hearing, because the indictment allegedly
has resolved the issue of probable cause. 51 Although both Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 5(c) and section 303 of the Federal Magistrates
Act require that a preliminary hearing be held within a reasonable time
after arrest, the latter goes on to say that if an indictment is returned
prior to a preliminary hearing, the hearing is no longer necessary. Thus,
as was true of the information procedure, if a federal prosecutor is able
to postpone the preliminary hearing long enough to discover his evidence
and obtain an indictment, the defendant is no longer entitled to a prelim46. In State ex rel. Carty v. Purdy, 240 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1970), the Florida Supreme Court
stated that if law enforcement officers continued such practices, then the courts might resort to a
McNabb-Mallory type rule that, in the federal courts, automatically excludes all evidence obtained

against a suspect prior to his probable cause determination before a magistrate, whether such
evidence is voluntarily obtained or not, and regardless of its probative value.
47. The court states that between January 1, 1970, and March 31, 1971, the state attorney
decided not to file direct informations in 1,165 cases in which defendants had been charged or
arrested as a result of police investigation. Most of these "no actions" resulted from arrests on

charges lacking sufficient evidence to justify the filing of an information.
48. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
49. See, e.g., Weinberg & Weinberg, The CongressionalInvitation to Avoid the Preliminary
Hearing:An Analysis of § 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1361

(1969). The authors here argue that the grand jury is not a proper body to reach an independent
judicial determination of probable cause, since it is primarily a rubber stamp for the prosecutor.
50. This discussion treats the indictment and the presentment procedures as identical.
51. See notes 19 &20 supra.
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inary hearing at all, despite the existence of the federal rule.5" A similar
procedure can be followed in Florida, despite the existence of new rules
of procedure5 3 calling for a preliminary hearing. Thus there is a real
possibility that an arrestee may be held in pretrial detention for a considerable period of time before a determination of probable cause is made,
and that this detention will not jeopardize the prosecutor's case if it is
cured by the return of an indictment. Although the instant opinion does
not address this problem, its constitutional arguments for an absolute
right to a preliminary hearing are persuasive, and it may be later inferred
that a preliminary hearing is necessary despite the existence of an indictment. There are excellent reasons why this inference should be made. As
pointed out by the Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court, speaking
in the context of the new state procedural rules,5 4 the preliminary hearing
"confers upon an accused person procedural rights which are unquestionably distinct and superior to whatever rights are available to an
accused at the ex parte grand jury and information stage of [criminal]
proceedings. '55 Such rights--including presence of counsel, compulsory
attendance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, and possibly even the right to suppress evidence-may have the effect of dissuading the prosecutor from seeking further prosecution of a weak case.,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5 guarantees similar procedural
rights to federal defendants, and some of these rights are capable of
being effectively lost if not available until trial. The right of discovery is
probably one of the most important to a defendant at a preliminary
hearing, for with it he can test the soundness of the case against him and
better prepare his defense. History shows that the original purpose of the
preliminary hearing was that of a discovery device, but most courts in
the United States have held that these hearings exist only to determine
probable cause. 57 Only recently have a few federal cases held that there
is also a need to use the preliminary hearing as a discovery device.5" The
52. Weinberg & Weinberg, supra note 49, at 1385; Comment, The PreliminaryExamination
in the FederalSystem:A Proposalfora Rule Change, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1416 (1968).
53. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.122.
54. Id.
55. Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729, 734 (Fla. 1970) (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. See Anderson, The PreliminaryHearing-BetterAlternatives or More of the Same?, 35
Mo. L. REv.281, 288 (1970); Weinberg & Weinberg, supra note 49, at 1365; Note, The Preliminary
Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IOWA L. REv. 164, 176 (1965); Comment, PreliminaryHearings-The Case for Revival, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 580, 583 (1967); Comment, supra note 52, at
1419.
58. See, e.g., Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
944 (1965).
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preliminary hearing is likely to become more and more important, even
to the point at which it will be recognized as an absolute right of all
criminal defendants, regardless of how they are arrested, charged, or
proceeded against. The instant case is an important step in that direction.

Federal Employees-Racial Discrimination-Back Pay
Remedy Implied When Federal Job Applicant Denied
Equal Employment Opportunity in Violation of Executive
Order No. 11,478
Plaintiff, a black applicant for federal employment, was refused a
job by the Social Security Administration (SSA) solely on the basis of
an unfavorable and racially motivated reference report from plaintiff's
former employer. At an administrative appeal before the SSA, plaintiff
alleged racial discrimination' in violation of Executive Order No.
11,478, which declares that equal employment opportunity is a policy

of the Government and prohibits such discrimination in federal employment. 2 The SSA found that plaintiff had not been discriminated against
because of race, but the Director of Equal Employment Opportunity for
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reversed that finding
and recommended plaintiff be considered for the next suitable position

available. Plaintiff, however, seeking immediate employment as well as
any back pay that would have accrued had she been hired, further ap-

pealed to the Civil Service Commission Board of Appeals and Review
1. Plaintiff argued that the hiring officer's failure to investigate the reference report to
determine the veracity of its contents and the merit of her charges of discrimination against her
former employer was itself a violation of the executive order. Plaintiff also alleged that the hiring
officer worked in an "environment of racial discrimination."
2. The order that was in effect at the time of the alleged discrimination by the Government
was Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 167 (Supp. 1965), but Exec. Order No. 11,478 superseded
it by the time of the trial. The terms of both orders are substantially identical concerning federal
employment. The more recent version provides in § I that "[i]t is the policy of the Government of
the United States to provide equal opportunity in Federal employment for all persons, to prohibit
discrimination in employment because of race. [sic] color, religion, sex, or national origin, and to
promote the full realization of equal employment opportunity through a continuing affirmative
program in each executive department and agency. This policy of equal opportunity applies to and
must be an integral part of every aspect of personnel policy and practice in the employment,
development, advancement, and treatment of civilian employees of the Federal Government." 3
C.F.R. 462 (Supp. 1971). Both orders were promulgated pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970)
(originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241,253-54 (1964)), which authorizes
the President to use his "existing authority" to carry out the stated policy.
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(BAR). Although the BAR awarded plaintiff an immediate position, it
did not feel that it had jurisdiction to award her back pay. Plaintiff then
brought the instant action in the Court of Claims to recover the back
pay. Defendant admitted that plaintiff would have been recommended
and hired had it not been for the unfavorable reference report and acknowledged that the denial of employment constituted discrimination in
violation of the executive order. Defendant argued, however, that an
action would not lie against the Government for the back pay of an
applicant never appointed to office because federal hiring is within the
complete discretion of the executive department, and because the Government did not waive sovereign immunity. On cross motions for summary judgment to the United States Court of Claims, held, for the
plaintiff. When a federal job applicant is denied equal employment opportunity in violation of Executive Order No. 11,478 and discretionary
elements of hiring are not present, the Court of Claims may imply a
monetary remedy from the executive order and award back pay.
Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
The nature of federal employment has long been considered a nonproprietary, noncontractual privilege 3 because of the constitutionally
5
granted4 executive discretion irW
t appointment of government officers.
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Holmes, no constitutional right to an appointment to federal or other public office exilts as an adjunct to other rights
granted by the Constitution.' The rationalp of executive discretion in this
area is that the federal government must noi,' e burdened by unnecessary
or unwanted employees. For example, veter'ahs of World War II had
no collective or individual right to retain their positions in the armed
forces after the termination of hostilities; likewise no action will lie
for failure of the President to appoint an applicant to the office of
Secretary of State. 7 In certain situations, however, the discretionary
3. Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890);
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). The Supreme Court
stated in Crenshaw that "[an officer] enjoys a privilege revocable. . . at will .
134 U.S. at

108.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
5. See, e.g., Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293 (1900) ("The appointment to an
official position in the Government, even if it be simply a clerical position, is not a mere ministerial
act, but one involving the exercise of judgment. . . . Therefore it is one of those acts over which
the courts have no general supervising power."); Tierney v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 77 (1964);
Donnelly v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 635 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
6. McAuliffev. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,220,29 N.E. 517,518 (1892).
7. Although there would seem to be a practical difference between "merit" and "executivepolitical" appointments-such as a Commander in the Navy as opposed to the Secretary of
State-Keim indicates that the discretionary function extends to all levels of the executive branch
in matters of hiring, discharge, and promotion, without regard to the functional necessity of
permitting the President to select his own staff.
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power of the executive has been limited either by statutes, executive
orders, or regulations that create employment discharge procedures

and preferences in hiring. 8 Federal employees discharged in violation of these procedural requirements have been permitted to
recover back pay even though the authority for the procedures created
no specific cause of action.9 In Service v. Dulles,"0 for example,
the Supreme Court granted back pay to an employee of the Department of State whose discharge violated existing regulations promulgated by the Secretary. The Court held that the attempted dismissal

was invalid because of procedural defects and ineffective as a discharge
of a government officer." The absence of an explicit creation of a cause

of action in the regulations was rendered unimportant by the following
analysis: the employee held a valid appointment as an officer of the

government, and since there had been no valid exercise of the discretion
to revoke his appointment, he remained for all purposes an officer and
was entitled, therefore, to enjoy the primary benefit of the privilege of
8. E.g., Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, ch. 287, 58 Stat. 387 (codified in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.). 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970) provides: "An individual . . . may be removed or suspended without pay only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Veterans
eligible for employment preferences, for example, are specifically granted the right to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission from an adverse decision made in an action against them for cause. 5
U.S.C. § 7701 (1970).
9. Fletcher v. United States, 392 F.2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (discharge in violation of Post Office
regulation allowing cross-examination of witnesses in administrative appeals); Mallow v. United
States, 161 Ct. Cl. 207 (1963) (discharge procedurally defective because plaintiff was denied personal appearance guaranteed by Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512(b)(2), 7701
(1970)); Daub v. United States, 292 F.2d 895 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (discharge in violation of Army
personnel regulations).
10. 354 U.S. 363 (1957). The Secretary of State sought to dismiss an officer for disloyalty
under the McCarran Rider, ch. 533, § 103, 65 Stat. 581 (1951), which authorized the Secretary to
exercise absolute discretion to discharge "whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or
advisable in the interests of the United States." Ruling that departmental procedural regulations
applied, the Supreme Court found that the Secretary of State could exercise his McCarran discretion only "following unfavorableaction in the employee's case by the Department Loyalty Security
Board. . .and approval of the Board's action by the Deputy Under Secretary." 354 U.S. at 375.
11. Id. at 388. In United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), the
Supreme Court found that a statement by the Attorney General prior to the Board of Immigration
Appeals' recommendation on plaintiff's petition to suspend deportation might have prejudiced the
Board's decision. Regulations required the Board to exercise its own judgment in all cases, including
decisions that would be reviewed by the Attorney General. The Court stated that it "object[ed] to
the Board's alleged failure to exercise its own discretion, contrary to existing valid regulations."
347 U.S. at 268. The Accardi principle is well stated by the Court in Service: "[R]egulations validly
prescribed by a government administrator are binding upon him as well as the citizen, and . ..
this principle holds even when the administrative action under review is discretionary in nature
....
[Blecause those regulations were violated. . . [plaintiff's] dismissal by the Secretary cannot
stand." 354 U.S. at 372.
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his office-the salary incident thereto. 12 The decisions in Watson v.
United States 3 and Glidden v. United States4 similarly indicate that
violations of a statutory best evidence rule in an administrative proceeding and failure to state reasons for unsatisfactory discharge are denials
of rights that will nullify attempted dismissals. Actions by federal employees to compel promotion-to recover back pay for a grade or status
to which the employees had not been appointed-have not fared so well,
however. These promotion cases in effect create a corollary to the discharge rationale and state that no person is entitled to the salary incident
to an office to which he has not been appointed, even if the reason is
negligent failure by the executive to exercise its discretion.' 5 In Gnotta
v. United States,8 plaintiff brought an action for discriminatory failure
to promote 7 in violation of Executive Order No. 11,246, the predecessor
of Executive Order No. 11,478.18 The Eighth Circuit, in discussing its
role vis-a-vis judicial review, 9 determined that a judgment for plaintiff
would be improper under the district courts' jurisdiction, which is concurrent with the Court of Claims',2 ° because of a statute banning any
court from reviewing discretionary agency actions. 2 ' The propriety of
implying a remedy for the employee from the executive order was like12. Ganse v. United States, 376 F.2d 900 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Price v. United States, 80 F. Supp.
542 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Borak v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 123 (Ct. CL.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 821
(1948).
13. 162 F. Supp. 755 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (probationary employee).
14. 185 Ct. Cl. 515 (1968) (Air Force court-martial based upon summary of investigative
report prepared in part by civilian police whom plaintiff had no opportunity to question).
15. United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750 (1878) (action by postmaster paid on commission
basis for increment of volume handled despite failure of Postmaster General to readjust basis;
judiciary held not competent to treat executive duties as performed when in fact neglected).
16. 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970).
17. Plaintiff alleged that his Italian ancestry prevented his promotion as an employee of the
Army Corps of Engineers. The hearing officer found, however, that the evidence did not support
the allegation of discrimination and the BAR agreed.
18. See note 2 supra. For a discussion of the history and antecedents of the executive orders
in question see Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964).
19. The majority relied upon the basic presumption that administrative functions are reviewable, which was adopted by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), and interpreted in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
20. Compare Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction, concurrently with the Court of Claims, of. . . [a]ny other civil action or claim
against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution,
or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort"), with 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970) (no monetary limitation).
21. "This chapter [judicial review] applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that . . . agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
(1970).
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wise discussed and rejected on the intent of its authors. Although not
discussed, the legislative history of section 7151 of title 5 of the United
States Code, 22 the present statutory authority for the order, discloses
that its origin is the first congressional treatment of discrimination in
public and private employment-the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .3 Reviewing the apparently successful previous treatment by executive order 24 of
discrimination in federal employment-an area otherwise devoid of statutory or decisional rules-Congress, in section 701 (b), provided for the
first time a statutory basis for such presidential orders, but at the same
time specifically exempted the federal government from the civil liability
imposed upon "employers" by the terms of Title VII for "unlawful
employment practices" that incude any discrimination against individuals: discharge, refusal to hire or promote, different treatment, etc. An
additional problem posed by the Gnotta court was sovereign immunity,
which, according to traditional views, cannot be waived by implication
or by any division of the Government other than Congress.28
The instant court first examined the effect of the stipulation between
the parties that but for defendant's racial discrimination, plaintiff would
have received federal employment. Since the majority considered the
stipulation equivalent to a concession that the discretionary functions of
appointment already had been exercised favorably and exhausted when
the hiring officer received the unfavorable reference report,27 the court
went on to consider whether Executive Order No. 11,478 properly could
be the basis of an implied remedy. The court reasoned that since it
previously had implied remedies for the violation of procedural rights
guaranteed by departmental regulations in discharge situations, it similarly could imply a remedy in the instant situation on the basis of the
executive order. Although it approved of the promotion cases in which
recovery had been denied on the executive discretionary rationale, the
majority did not consider them dispositive of the instant issue. Because
the majority interpreted the stipulation to mean that no discretionary
22. "It is the policy of the United States to insure equal employment opportunities for
employees without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The
President shall use his existing authority to carry out this policy." 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970).
23. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-54. Since this portion of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -15 (1970), as well as 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970), an
investigation of the context of the section's enactment in search for congressional intent is difficult.
24. See Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
26. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
27. It appears that the discrimination occurred after the hiring officer normally would have
made his final determination and/or did in fact determine to recommend plaintiff, but the temporal
aspect of the factual situation and of the stipulation is somewhat unclear.
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decisions remained to be made concerning plaintiff and that all such
decisions already made had been favorable to plaintiff's application at

the point in the hiring process at which the proscribed discrimination
occurred, the majority concluded that only ministerial functions remained to be performed. The court thus considered its decision as nei-

ther reviewing nor performing a discretionary function, but merely as
ascertaining what rights, if any, were created in plaintiff by the violation
of Executive Order No. 11,478. Turning to those rights, the court next
reasoned that since the executive order in question had been promulgated

by the President with the knowledge of the court's existing jurisdiction,
and since Congress intended general jurisdictional statutes to be controlling in the absence of a contrary manifestation,2s the executive order and
its statutory authority created in plaintiff a right to equal employment
opportunity, the denial of which caused plaintiff to suffer a wrong at the
hands of the SSA. In the absence of a statute expressly barring a remedy 2 9 the majority concluded that the implication of a remedy would be

proper. The majority reasoned that while it could not appoint plaintiff
to office,30 it could award money damages as compensation for a legal
wrong and accordingly held that plaintiff was entitled to recover back
pay.31
In an extended dissent, Judge Skelton 32 urged that the instant court

28. In United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969), the Supreme Court reasoned that the
absence of a clear indication that Congress did not intend the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970), to apply to the Court of Claims was insufficient to confer jurisdiction to render such judgments. For a broad discussion of implied remedies see Note, Implying Civil
Remedies from FederalRegulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285 (1963). For a discussion of
statutory construction based upon the type of statute involved see 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2801 (3d ed. 1943); 3 id. § 5818.
29. See notes 19 & 28 supra.
30. "If this court were to grant recovery to plaintiff it would in effect bestow upon plaintiff
a promotion which he never received. In doing so, this court would be making an administrative
decision." Tierney v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 77, 80 (1964); see note 15 supra.
31. The majority cited Betts v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 450, 454 (Ct. CI. 1970), for the
proposition that absent authority to make appointments, the Court of Claims "does have jurisdiction to award . . . damages as compensation for violations of rights granted . . . by statute or
regulation." The court, in awarding summary judgment to plaintiff, stated that it "hold[s] that
less any amount she might have earned in the interim." 451
plaintiff can recover back pay .
F.2d at 1054 (emphasis added).
32. Chief Judge Cowen also dissented, arguing that plaintiff had not been discriminated
against in violation of statutory policy and the executive orders. He reasoned on the basis of Swift
& Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 243 U.S. 281 (1917), that a stipulation "contrary to the facts shown
in the record" may be rejected. 451 F.2d at 1058 (Cowen, C.J., dissenting). Referring to the hiring
of another Negro to the position plaintiff otherwise would have obtained, Judge Skelton likewise
found no violation of government equal opportunity policies: "If there was any discrimination, it
was between two Negroes as individuals and without regard to race." Id. at 1086. Judges Skelton
and Cowen both agreed with the hearing examiner that the hiring officer who refused to recommend
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did not have jurisdiction to render judgment for plaintiff. Since plaintiff
was never appointed to office, and since the executive department and
not the courts have exclusive authority to appoint, Judge Skelton concluded that the majority in effect acted beyond the competence of the
Court of Claims. Moreover, because there was no specific provision in
the statute or executive order creating a cause of action, the dissent
reasoned that none should be implied, and that if implied, such a cause
of action would be nullified by the absence of an express waiver of
sovereign immunity. Finally, Judge Skelton observed that since plaintiff's cause of action was based upon an alleged wrongful act of an
officer of the Government in the exercise of his function, plaintiff was
actually suing on conduct sounding in tort, over which the Court of
Claims has no jurisdiction.3
The force of logic supports the reasoning that led Judge Skelton to
conclude in his dissent that the Court of Claims was without jurisdiction
to hear the instant case. Recovery in the typical discharge case generally
has been premised on the fact that the employee held a valid appointment, which remained unrevoked because the disputed attempt to dismiss had been procedurally defective. Under this theory, the employee
was on a par with any other employee of the Government, who, apparently forgotten when monthly checks were issued, seeks to recover the
salary due him by virtue of his office-a situation sufficiently contractual in nature to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. In a
promotion suit, on the other hand, the discretion of the executive forms
an absolute bar to recovery34 because, by reason of the failure of the
executive to appoint the employee, the greater salary sought is incident
to an office that the employee does not hold. The dissent thus perceived
the exercise of discretion in federal employment as an all-or-nothing
proposition and rejected the majority's suggested intermediate position
of a complete and favorable exercise of discretion without formal applaintiff was under no duty or obligation to investigate the veracity of the unfavorable reference
report submitted by plaintiff's former employer. Judge Davis, in his opinion concurring with the
majority, addressed himself solely to the dissenting judges' treatment of the stipulation of discrimination, pointing out that the case had been pleaded and argued on the stipulation and that the
administrative transcripts and investigative report on which the dissenters relied had not been part
of the record because neither party had entered them. Despite his statement that the issue of
discrimination was eliminated from the investigation of the court by the stipulation, Judge Davis
determined under the rationale of Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir.
1969), that plaintiff's rights indeed had been violated. 451 F.2d at 1057 (Davis, J., concurring).

33.

28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970) limits the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to "any claim

against the United States. . . for. . . damages in cases not sounding in tort."
34. The majority deemed this bar to have been removed and would not have granted recovery

but for this interpretation of the stipulation.
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pointment. This infusion of a substantial performance doctrine into the
question of executive hiring discretion, implied in the majority opinion,

would be neither helpful nor appropriate. The dissent does not treat in
any depth the validity of implying a remedy from Executive Order No.
11,478, but Judge Skelton's refusal to find such a remedy is readily

supportable in light of the legislative history of the statutory authorization supporting the order.3 s It would be difficult indeed to argue that
Congress, by specifically exempting the United States from the civil
liability otherwise imposed for employment discrimination by Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, intended to imply this liability from a
3
bare statement of the employment policy of the federal government.

Indeed, Senator Humphrey, in explaining the addition of this statement
to the House version of the bill, indicated that it did not purport to create
any new substantive law.3 Even if Congress had intended or envisioned
an implied remedy against the Government by its enactment of what is
now section 7151 of title 5 of the United States Code, the requirement
38
of an express and specific waiver of sovereign immunity was not met.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the dissent lies in Judge Skelton's
denomination of the true nature of plaintiff's claim as tortious. An

examination of the Federal Tort Claims Act 39 discloses that by the literal
terms of this statute, Congress created an "executive discretion" excep-

tion, retaining immunity to actions which, like plaintiff's, were based
upon the execution of a statute or regulation by an employee of the
Government or upon the exercise of a discretionary function." Even

assuming the majority's premise that no discretionary elements are involved to bar recovery, the first portion of the exception remains unaf35.
36.

See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
See5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970).

37.

UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3004 (1966). M. SOVERN, LEGAL
RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 66 (1966), stated that "Title VII's failure to repeat this
substantive requirement [refraining from practicing racial discrimination] is, by itself, unimportant;
however, the exclusion means that victims of government discrimination are left to their old remedies. If Title VII offers something better, the failure to make it available to victims of government
discrimination is regrettable."
38. Cf United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940) (no waiver of sovereign immunity by
filing claim against estate, absent specific statutory permission to be sued).
39. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). The section excludes from the coverage of the Act those
claims "based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in
the execution of a statute or regulation . . . or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency . . . ." In
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32 (1953), the Supreme Court stated: "One only need read
[28 U.S.C.] § 2680 in its entirety to conclude that Congress exercised care to protect the Government from claims, however negligently caused, that affected the governmntal functions."
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fected by the logic of this premise. However, the presence of this exception implied that Congress considered such conduct tortious, and as the
dissent forcefully points out, claims for damages in cases sounding in
tort are specifically excluded from the jurisdiction granted the Court of
Claims."
The result reached by the majority at first glance would seem far
reaching in its impact-the imposition of liability on the federal government for racial discrimination in violation of a job applicant's implied
right to equal employment opportunity. On further examination it becomes clear, however, that the basis of this decision-the majority's
evaluation of stipulated discrimination as an exclusion of discretionary
elements of hiring-is in reality a highly restricted development. On a
pragmatic level, it is doubtful whether such a stipulation will be made
in the future, thus limiting recovery to instances when the plaintiff can
prove both actual discrimination and full exercise of all discretionary
elements of hiring in a manner favorable to the applicant. The majority's
avoidance of any profound examination of the jurisdictional questions
raised by Judge Skelton's dissent is perhaps more indicative of a sympathetic view of the issues involved and of a striving to achieve a just result
than of an objective evaluation of the merits of the instant case. While
it is apparent that some change is needed in the existing status of the
law regarding the "rights" of federal employees, the instant decision is
not sufficiently broad to afford any practical remedy for existing abuses
and will serve mainly to stimulate forum shopping. In addition, given
the size of the federal bureaucracy, it is doubtful that payment of a
judgment in Washington will have great practical force in changing
personal discrimination by federal employees in local offices throughout
the nation. A statutory fine imposed upon discriminating government
officials, payable directly to the victim, probably would be a more effective deterrent to such violations of federal policy than a reprimand from
a distant superior.
41.

28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).

454
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Securities Regulation-Section 5 of the Securities Act of
1933-Registration of Spin-off Distributions of
Subsidiary's Stock Required
Plaintiff, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), sought
to have defendants' enjoined from future distributions of subsidiaries'
unregistered stock. The action was commenced after a series of transactions whereby four subsidiaries of defendant Harwyn, a publicly held
corporation, obtained the assets of unaffiliated, nonpublic corporations
in exchange for Harwyn's controlling interest in each subsidiary. 2 Following the asset acquisitions by the subsidiaries, Harwyn spun-offP to its
own shareholders some of its retained and unregistered shares in the
subsidiaries. The final step in these transactions was the development of
an over-the-counter market in the spun-off shares.' By this method the
previously nonpublic asset-contributing corporations were able to enter
the public market without registration when shares of their newly acquired corporate shells were traded by Harwyn's shareholders. 5 Plaintiff
contended that "spinning off" a subsidiary's unregistered shares in furtherance of a plan to convert the subsidiary into a publicly held corporation constituted a violation of the registration requirements in section 5
of the 1933 Securities Act.' Defendants argued that the registration
I. The SEC brought suit in federal district court under Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 22, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), which provides that district courts of the United States have
jurisdiction over any action brought by the SEC. There were 15 named defendants in the action,
including Harwyn Industries, its officers, and the Harwyn subsidiaries and their officers.
2. SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943,954 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
3. In a spin-off the parent corporation declares a dividend to its stockholders. The dividend
is paid in the form of shares of stock in subsidiaries of the parent. For a more detailed discussion
of the spin-off transaction see H. SOWARDS, THE FEDERAL SECURITES AcT § 2.02(2) (1971); How
Stocks Debut at the Back Door, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 29, 1969, at 123.
4. In each of the 4 transactions the new management of the subsidiary facilitated the development of trading by listing the subsidiary's stock with the National Quotation Bureau for over-thecounter trading. 326 F. Supp. at 946.
5. A "shell corporation" is a publicly owned, once viable, enterprise whose assets have been
dissipated so that little remains other than the corporate name. A "clean shell" is one without past
debts or outstanding lawsuits. How Stocks Debut at the Back Door,supra note 3, at 123.
All 4 of the Harwyn subsidiaries involved here were shell corporations; however, the clearest
example is that of Harwyn's subsidiary Motel. Motel was wholly owned by Harwyn, had never
engaged in any significant business, and had no assets of any value. The company (Group V) seeking
to go public transferred all of its assets into Motel and in exchange was issued controlling (80%)
interest in Motel's stock. What stock Harwyn retained in Motel then was spun off to Harwyn's
shareholders who proceeded to trade the stock on the public market, thus creating a market in it.
6. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1970), provides: "Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful. . . directly or indirectly. . .(2) to
carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means of instru-
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requirements of the Act were applicable to spin-off transactions, assert-

ing that such transactions were not "sales for value" within the meaning
of section 2(3) of the Securities Act. 7 The district court held, judgment
for plaintiff.8 A spin-off, by a parent corporation, of a subsidiary's
unregistered shares, when undertaken to create a public market in the
shares, constitutes a sale that requires registration under the 1933 Securities Act. SEC v. Harwyn Industries Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
The 1933 Securities Act was designed to protect investors by requiring complete disclosure of facts affecting stock issues through registra-

tion with the SEC prior to public sale.' Section 5(a) ° renders unlawful
all sales, through the mails or in interstate commerce, of any unregistered security. A sale is defined in section 2(3)11 as including every contract of sale or disposition of a security, or interest therein, for value.

The courts have interpreted the two provisions broadly, requiring regis-

2
tration whenever possible, in order to effectuate the purpose of the Act.1
There are, however, two exemptions from the registration requirement
that are pertinent here. The first appears in section 4(1), which exempts

"transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or
ments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale .... "
In addition to violation of the registration provisions, the SEC also alleged violation of the
antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. These additional allegations were dismissed summarily by the court.
7. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970), defines "sale" to include "every
contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value." Securities Act of
1933, § 4(!), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970), however, provides: "The provisions of section 77e of this
title shall not apply to-l)
transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer."
8. The court, however, denied injunctive relief. Defendants had relied on past SEC inaction
in spin-off situations, and had consulted legal counsel to ascertain the legality of the transaction
and the proper legending of the stock issued to insiders as unregistered and for purposes of investment only. One defendant had sought the SEC's opinion but had received no answer. Under these
circumstances the court found it would be inequitable to grant injunctive relief. Cf Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1944).
9. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953); A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene
Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38,40 (1941); Gilligan, Will& Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d461,463 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970).
12. "The supplementary provisions and definitions are so designed as to prevent any circumvention of the registration requirement by devious and sundry means. This is one of the reasons
for broad and liberal interpretations the courts have uniformly given to this particular phase of the
Securities Act of 1933." SEC v. North American Research & Development Corp., 424 F.2d 63,
71 (2d Cir. 1970); cf. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)
(court looked to the legislative intent rather than the liberal meaning of the word "employee" as
used in the Motor Carrier Act); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Court broadly construed the phrase "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" as it was used in § 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act).
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dealer."' 13 The most inclusive of these terms-underwriter-is defined in

section 2(11), for purposes of this exemption, as "any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer
in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or
has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking ....""
The policy supporting the exemption is to insulate sales by the ordinary
investor from the registration requirement.' 5 The second exemption, rule
133,16 is relevant in the context of stock exchange transactions made
pursuant to plans for mergers or consolidations. The rationale of the
exemption is that when stockholders collectively authorize the corporate

act, the element of individual consent required for a sale in the contractual sense is lacking. 7 In recent years the SEC has been increasingly
concerned that the "no-sale" rule furnishes a vehicle for evasion of the
9 this concern
Act's regulation provisions.18 In SEC v. Micro-Moisture"

led to a successful action by the SEC to prevent use of the Rule 133
exemption when the merger and exchange of stock were merely steps in
a larger plan by the controlling shareholders to market unregistered
stock. Subsequently, in Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd.,2 0 the SEC declared

the exemption totally inapplicable to this kind of transaction. The Commission held that when the issuer, or person acting on his behalf, has
knowledge of a plan to market unregistered securities through share-

holders, registration of the securities is required under section 5. Transactions meeting the requirements of the rule in appearance only were
13. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970).
14. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1970).
15. "Congress clearly intended to exempt sales by the ordinary investor regardless of the
derelictions [regarding registration] of his broker or dealer." I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
644 (2d ed. 1961).
16. SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1971), provides in part: "(a) For purposes only of
section 5 of the Act, no 'sale,' 'offer to sell,' or 'offer for sale' shall be deemed to be involved so
far as the stockholders of a corporation are concerned where, pursuant to statutory provisions in
the state of incorporation, there is submitted to the vote of such stockholders a plan or agreement
for a statutory merger or consolidation or reclassification of assets of such corporation to another
person in consideration of the issuance of securities of such other person ...." For a more
complete discussion of Rule 133 see Orrick, Registration Problems Under the FederalSecurities
Act-Resales Following Rule 133 and Exchange Transactions,10 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1958).
17. 1 L. Loss, supra note 15, at521.
18. "It has become increasingly clear that the 'no-sale' rule, which is a rule of statutory
construction or definition, has become an instrument of evasion of the law and a means by which
illegal distributions of securities have been achieved in secrecy and in violation not only of the
registration and disclosure provisions of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act." SEC
Securities Act Release No. 3698 (Oct. 2, 1956).
19. 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),final injunctiongranted, 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), affd sub nom., SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
20. 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957).
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strongly condemned. 2 ' The SEC has exhibited similar concern over use
of the spin-off as a means to avoid sale characterization. When employed for that purpose, the spin-off prevents the distributing corporation from qualifying as an underwriter and allows the transaction to be
included within the 4(l) exemption. 22 The House Reports on the original

bill furnished a sound basis for the belief that spin-off distributions were
exempt as transactions that did not constitute a sale. 23 In 1946 the SEC

strengthened this view in a release stating that neither dividends nor
distribution of securities to stockholders constituted a sale requiring
registration.2 1 Since that time, however, the SEC has attempted to close
the gap, characterized by some commentators as a "loophole," in the
registration requirements of the Act.?' A 1969 release, for example, was

issued for this purpose, but it was ambiguous and did not clearly apply
to spin-offs of the Harwyn type. 26 Thus, although there had been no

decision on the question whether spin-offs are sales requiring registration,27 it appeared settled that, despite SEC objection, spun-off shares
of a subsidiary's stock were exempt from registration.2
The instant court acknowledged at the outset that stock dividends
do not normally constitute a sale and thus are not ordinarily within the
purview of the section's registration requirement. The court distinguished the conventional stock dividend, however, from the instant spinoffs, asserting that in the principal case the primary purpose of Har21. Id. at 691.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1970).
23. "The House provision exempting stock dividends . . . is omitted from the substitute
[bill], since stock dividends are exempt without express provision, as they do not constitute a sale,
not being given for value." H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933).
24. The SEC further clarified the exemption with a release providing: "Neither the declaration of the dividend, nor the distribution of the securities to stockholders . . . would in my opinion
constitute a sale within the meaning of the Securities Act, and no registration of the securities so
distributed would be required under the Act." SEC Securities Act Release No. 929 (July 29, 1936).
25. "The availability of the spin-off remains as a dangerous loophole in the securities laws."
Note, The Spin-Off"A Sometimes Sale, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 132, 143 (1970).
26. "Under such a pattern, when the shares are issued to a publicly owned or acquiring
company, a sale takes place within the meaning of the Securities Act, and if the shares are then
distributed to the shareholders of the acquiring company, that company may be an underwriter
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act as a person 'who purchased from an issuer with a
view to . . . the distribution of any security' or as a person who 'has a direct or indirect participation in any undertaking.'" SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982 (July 2, 1968).
27. Note, supra note 25, at 132.
28. "The declaration of an ordinary stock dividend does not constitute a sale for the reason
that there is no transfer for value. Similar reasoning should apply to a 'spin-off,' wherein the parent
company declares a dividend to stockholders payable in the stock of its subsidiary. Such a dividend
should not constitute a sale." II H. SOWARDS, supra note 3, § 2.02(2); see Bromberg, Corporation
Liquidation and Securities Law-Problems in the Distributionof Portfolio Securities, 3 B.C. IND.
&COM. L. REv. 1 (1961); cf. I L. Loss, supra note 15, at 517-18.
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wyn's distribution of its shares in its subsidiaries had been the creation
of an active public market in the unregistered shares. Construing the
spin-offs as a critical element in the ultimate achievement of the public
market, the court held that the scheme must be considered in its entirety
and not as a mere isolated distribution. The court then turned to the
question whether Harwyn's spin-off distributions were given for value
and whether they constituted a sale within the definition of section 2(3).
Acknowledging the reasonableness of defendants' position to the contrary,291 the court, nevertheless, concluded that defendants had received
value for the unregistered spun-off shares by virtue of the public market
created for the unregistered shares and the assets transferred to the
subsidiaries. Because it found nothing in section 2(3) requiring that the
value in a sale flow from the parties who receive the stock distribution,
the court reasoned that Harwyn's distribution of the shares had been for
value; thus the spin-off of the unregistered shares constituted a "sale."
The court then determined that because of the sale Harwyn had qualified
as an underwriter under section 2(11) and, therefore, was not entitled to
an exemption from registration by reason of section 4(1). The court
explained its holding by acknowledging that its interpretation of the
statute was accomplished with an emphasis on the statute's broad purpose of providing adequate disclosure to members of the investing public. The only means of preventing the subversion of that purpose, the
court concluded, was to refrain from "strangulating literalism" 30 and
require that shares of subsidiaries' stock be registered prior to spin-off
distributions.
In the instant decision the court sought to extend the Act's protection of investors and to close the spin-off "loophole" by treating the
spin-off and its accompanying steps as a single transaction constituting
a "sale for value. 13 1 The difficulty with this approach is that the value
upon which the court relied is the establishment of a public market in
the unregistered shares, which is dependent upon "fortuitous sales by
shareholders of the [parent] corporation, and . . . is not really given by
any one of them, but rather is generatedby the shareholders acting as a
group. ' 32 Value does not proceed from the distributees to the distributor,
although commentators have stressed that it must in such cases.3 3 Since
29. See note 8 supra.
30. 326 F. Supp. at 954.
31. Id.
32. Note, supra note 25, at 141 (emphasis in original).
33. "Apparently, no court has ever had occasion to say that a 'distribution' occurs only if
the distributees give 'value,' but this is almost surely a correct statement." Bromberg, supra note
29, at 10.
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the distributees do not give value for the shares, they are not within the
protective scope of the Act.34 Moreover, because they are not issuers,
underwriters, or dealers, the Act places no limitation on subsequent sales
by them.35 By finding value in the instant case, however, the court effectively made the subsidiary the issuer and the parent corporation, both
by definition and earlier releases'3 a section 2(11) underwriter whose
subsequent stock distribution required registration. The decision therefore constitutes a judicial expansion of the term "sale" beyond the scope
of its intended meaning. 3 7 By expanding the definition of a "sale"
Harwyn has introduced the possibility that legitimate transactions, such
as normal stock dividends and even outright gifts of unregistered stock,
will be subject to challenge on the same grounds as the distribution in
the instant case. The intended result could have been attained, without
resort to this dangerous extentsion of the term "sale," by applying the
reasoning adopted in Micro-Moistureand Sweet Grass. Had the instant
court construed the spin-off as an element of a plan to distribute unregistered stock to the public, it readily could have found that the issuer had
had knowledge of the plan, and therefore it could have concluded that
the parent had acted on behalf of the issuer. The subsequent spin-off
distribution by the parent thus would have required registration. While
a holding to that effect would provide the courts with considerable discretion in determining when a spin-off is only the final step in a plan to
circumvent the registration requirement and would effectively close the
spin-off loophole, it is subject to the same criticism as that which followed the Sweet Grass holding. The hypothetical holding in effect would
close the loophole by reading the sale requirement out of section 5 registration provisions.3 Before either of these approaches is widely adopted
a more acceptable solution to the spin-off problem should be devised.
While other means have been suggested,3 9 the SEC's recently adopted
34. Note, supra note 25, at 141.
35. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 2,4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b), (d) (1970).
36. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3698 (Oct. 2, 1956).
37. "It [SEC] has sound precedent in the light of landmark decisions involving securities
distributed subsequent to a merger and in its long-standing interpretation and treatment of secondI 11"H. SOWARDS, supra note 3, § 2.02[9].
ary distributions in connection with Rule 133 ....
38. "In any event, where the persons negotiating an exchange, merger or similar transaction
have sufficient control of the voting stock to make a vote of stockholders a mere formality, Rule
133 does not apply. In such case the transaction is not corporate action in a real sense, but rather
is action reflecting the consent of the persons in control, and consequently results in a 'sale' to them.
Therefore, if an exemption from registration is available it must be found in the statute and cannot
be based on Rule 133." Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683, 691 (1957).
39. One suggestion is to borrow the "legitimate business purpose" test from tax law and to
allow only spin-offs that are justified by a business reason. Note, supra note 25, at 143; Comment,
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Rule 15(c)2-1 140 offers the most workable approach. Under this rule, the
spin-off problem is met at the broker-dealer level. The rule makes it
unlawful for any broker-dealer to submit a quotation to an interdealer
quotation system unless the security has been the subject of bid-and-ask
quotations on a regular basis within the last 30 days. 41 This rule prevents
broker-dealers, without whom a market cannot be effectively established, 42 from creating active markets in the inactive stocks of shell
corporations, the most frequent spin-off vehicle. In addition to the broad
proscription against avoiding registration through stock spin-offs, the
proposed rule includes an exception4 3 that permits broker-dealers to establish a market in inactive stock if detailed information summaries
concerning the issuer and the security are maintained and kept available.
While under the exception it is still possible to create a public market in
unregistered shares, the detailed information requirement will protect the
public by providing as much information on which to base investment44
decisions as would have been available from a registration statement.
Thus the new rule should close the "back door" to the trading markets
and protect the investor by assuring the availability of adequate information, at the same time the rule will prevent the establishment of a regulatory approach that could hinder legitimate spin-offs of subsidiary corporation shares.
Securities Regulation: Corporate Spin-offs As a Device for Public Distribution Without
Registration, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 111, 116-18 (1970), suggests using third-party beneficiary
contract theory to bring spin-offs under § 2(3) as a "contract of sale or disposition of a security."
40. Wall Street J., Sept. 13, 1971, at 12, col. 1.
41. 35 Fed. Reg. 10597 (1970).
42. Id. at 10597-98.
43. In Harwyn the court noted that the spun-off securities were prepared for public trading
by listing them with the National Quotation Bureau prior to distribution. 326 F. Supp. at 946.
44. Subparagraph (4) of the rule provides an exception to the 30-day limitation if the brokerdealer issuing the quotation makes available information including a current balance sheet, profit
and loss statement for the past 2 years, number of shares issued and numbers outstanding, and
members of the board of directors. 35 Fed. Reg. 10598 (1970).
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Securities Regulation-Section 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934-A Group Owning More Than
Than Five Percent of a Company's Stock Must File
Within Ten Days of its Formation
Appellant, GAF Corporation, filed a complaint in federal district
court' alleging that appellees had violated section 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,2 which requires any person or group acquiring
more than ten percent 3 of a class of registered equity securities to file
certain statements within ten days of the acquisition.4 Appellees, four
members of the same family, together owned approximately 10.25 percent of GAF's preferred shares outstanding, although no individual
member owned more than ten percent. Appellant contended that appellees had pooled their interests to seize control of GAF, and that the
group thus formed had acquired beneficial ownership of the stock formerly held by the group's members as individuals. Therefore, appellant
maintained that the group, as an entity separate from its members, was
obligated to comply with section 13(d).5 Appellees asked that the complaint be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court granted this request, reasoning that the
1. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
3. As of December 22, 1970, § 13(d)(1) was amended to require filing after the acquisition
of 5% of a class of equity securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970).
4. Section 13(d) pr6vides in pertinent part: "(d)(l) Any person who, after acquiring directly
or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security . . . is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition,
send to the issuer of the security . . . send to each exchange where the security is traded, and file
with the Commission, a statement containing such of the following information...
(A) the background and identity of all persons by whom or on whose behalf the purchases
have been or are to be effected;
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be used in making
the purchases...
(C) if the purpose of the purchases . . . is to acquire control . . . any plans or proposals
which such persons may have to liquidate such issuer...
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned...
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with any person with
respect to any securities of the issuer.
"(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other
group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate
or group shall be deemed a 'person' for the purposes of this subsection."
5. Appellees contended that appellant did not have standing to assert a violation of § 13(d)
or § 10(b). The court determined that appellant did have standing to assert a violation of § 13(d),
but not to assert a violation of § 10(b).
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mere formation of a group seeking control without acquiring additional
stock does not require filing.6 On appeal to the Second Circuit, held,
reversed. The formation of a group owning more than ten percent of a
class of equity securities of a corporation constitutes the acquisition of
beneficial ownership of the securities by the group, and therefore is a
reportable event under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971).
Section 13(d) was added to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
the Williams Act of 1968.7 The latter Act, as originally introduced, was
designed to reduce the growing number of corporate takeovers accomplished by stock acquisition.8 Congress soon learned, however, that corporate takeovers are not necessarily detrimental to the public interest,
and in fact, are often beneficial.9 Therefore, Congress abandoned its
negative view of corporate takeovers and used the bill to provide for
investor protection during battles for corporate control." The announced intent of Congress was to provide shareholders and the investing public with the information necessary to make informed investment
decisions without "tipping the scales . . . in favor of management or in
favor of persons making takeover bids."" In trying to fulfill this intent,
the Act was specifically designed to deal with the two methods of corporate acquisition that previously had not been covered by securities law:
(I) cash tender offers, and (2) open-market or privately negotiated ac13
quisitions.12 Section 13(d) was the congressional response to the latter.
Congress realized that an individual or group could acquire the power
to influence or change management through large open-market or privately negotiated purchases without informing the investing public of its
intentions toward the company. To avoid this situation, section 13(d)
provides that any person or group acquiring more than five percent of a
6.
7.

324 F. Supp. at 1068.
Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-1-n

(1964).
8. In his floor speech Senator Harrison Williams (D., N.J.), who introduced the bill, stated:
"In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells after white-collar
pirates have seized control . . . then sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up most of
the loot among themselves." 111 CONG. REc. 28257 (1965).
9. It was pointed out in the Senate hearings that corporate takeovers often prove beneficial
to shareholders by providing imaginative new management or by forcing old management to take
innovative steps. Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1967).
10. S.REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., IstSess. 2 (1967).
1I. 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967).
12. S.REP. No. 550,supranote 10, at 3.
13. Requirements for cash tender offers are codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970).
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class of equity securities must file, within ten days after acquisition, a
disclosure statement with the SEC, the target corporation, and the exchange on which the issuer's securities are traded." Congress neglected,
however, to define "acquisition" for the purpose of triggering the filing
requirement of section 13(d), but the House and Senate Reports did
address themselves directly to the issue of when a group should file.
These reports emphasize that when a number of individuals who collectively own more than ten percent of a class of securities agree to act in
concert, the group has become beneficial owner of the securities at the
time of agreement." The only case that had dealt with when a group has
acquired ten percent of a class under section 13(d) was Bath Industries,
Inc. v. Blot." Blot, a member of the board of directors and a shareholder
in Bath, had become dissatisfied with Bath's president and sought to
have him removed. Encountering opposition from the other directors,
Blot formed a group of individuals who controlled substantial voting
interests in Bath stock. The group collectively owned more than ten
percent of the company's stock, although no individual owned more
than ten percent. Bath filed a complaint alleging violation of the filing
and disclosure provisions of section 13(d). The district court held that
the group should have filed within ten days of its formation. 7 When
appealed, however, the Seventh Circuit held that disclosure is required
"when, but only when, any group of stockholders owning more than
10% of the outstanding shares of the corporation agree to act in concert
to acquire additionalshares." 8
The instant court stated that for the purpose of deciding whether
the 12(b)(6) motion was properly granted, it must accept as true all the
properly pleaded allegations in the complaint. Thus, given that appellees
had formed a group owning more than ten percent of GAF's stock for
the purpose of taking control, the court reasoned that the critical issue
14.

This statement must also disclose the purchaser's identity, source of funds, existing

arrangements as to shares, and any plans for control. Id. §§ 78m(d)(l), (3).
15. The House and Senate Reports state: "Section 13(d)(3) would prevent a group of persons
who seek to pool their voting or other interests in the securities of an issuer from evading the
provisions of the statute because no one individual owns more than 10 percent of the securities.
The group would be deemed to have become the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of more

than 10 percent of a class of securities at the time they agreed to act in concert. Consequently, the
group would be required to file the information called for in section 13(d)(l) within 10 days after
they agree to act together, whether or not any member of the group had acquired any securities at
that time." S. REp. No. 550, supra note 10, at 8; H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9

(1968).
16. 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), noted in 71 COLUM. L. REv. 466 (1971); 45 N.Y.U.L.
1136 (1970).
17. Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 305 F. Supp. 526, 538 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
18. 427 F.2d at 109 (emphasis in original).
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was whether there had been an acquisition by the group that would
trigger the reporting section of the statute. Finding no definition of
"acquisition" in the Act, the court turned to the dictionary and found
that it means "to come into possession [or] control."' 9 In determining
whether the group came into possession or control of the members'
stock, the court was not limited to examining legal title to the securities, which remained in the members, because section 13(d) requires
filing by those acquiring beneficial ownership of the stock.2" The court
then analyzed the components of beneficial ownership of stock and
found that, in battles for corporate control, the only relevant element is
voting control. The court further reasoned that since the purpose of
forming the appellee group was to seek corporate control, the group
must have received the voting control of its members' stock. Thus the
court found that the group, by gaining voting control of the stock, had
obtained beneficial ownership of the stock, and this constituted "acquisition" under section 13(d). The court also noted that the history and
purpose of the Act supported its holding. In conclusion, the court stated
that the creation of an organized group of substantial stockholders was
an occurrence with sufficient potential for changing or influencing corporate control that such an aggregation alone, without purchase of additional shares, would trigger the disclosure requirements of section 13(d).
The principal reason for the conflicting conclusions reached by the
Bath court and the instant court is the different emphasis they placed
on the two elements of congressional purpose behind section 13(d): 2 1 (1)
to provide investor protection, (2) without favoring either management
or persons seeking control. The Bath court, while recognizing the intent
to protect investors, relied mainly upon the congressional desire to
"avoid tipping the scales" as its justification for the strained interpretation given section 13(d).22 That court rejected the two interpretations of
the deadline for disclosure that are most consistent with the wording of
the statute: (1) disclosure within ten days of the formation of the group,
z
and (2) disclosure within ten days after acquiring additional shares. 2
Instead, it effected a judicial compromise by requiring disclosure after
formation, but before the acquisition of additional shares. 24 Thus, the
19. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 18 (1961).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970).
21. This possibility was suggested in Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosureof Corporate
Equity Ownership, 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 853, 871 (1971), which provided a detailed analysis of
§ 13(d) and predicted the outcome of the instant case.
22. Id.; see427 F.2d at 109; 71 COLUM. L. REV.466, 473 (1971).
23. See Comment, supra note 21, at 869.
24. 427 F.2d at 109.
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Bath court sacrificed sound statutory construction in favor of congressional neutrality in the struggle for corporate control. The instant court,
on the other hand, placed its emphasis on investor protection. It realized
that while Congress might have hoped that the statute would not aid
either side in the conflict, the bill, as enacted, did give an advantage to
incumbent management.21 Furthermore, Congress was fully apprised of
this result when it passed the Williams Act, 21 and apparently decided that
investor protection deserved priority over strict neutrality. The instant
court recognized that the mere formation of a group controlling more
than ten percent of a class of stock constituted an event that indicated a
significant possibility for change in the issuer's management and that as
a result the investor should be notified as soon as possible. Thus the
court found that the statute required disclosure within ten days of the
formation of the group. Although the facts of the instant case are limited
to a group formed for the purpose of seeking control, the court's holding
and the legislative history in no way indicate that section 13(d) disclosure
is limited to situations involving attempted corporate takeovers. The
underlying principle of section 13(d) is that all new, rapidly accumulated
aggregations of stock 27 are potentially influential in corporate matters,
meriting investor notification regardless of the accumulator's motive.
Whether such sweeping disclosure requirements are desirable remains to
be seen. It is apparent, however, that when the instant decision is compared to Bath, it is superior for two basic reasons: (1) it chooses an
interpretation that is consistent with the wording of the statute, and (2)
it gives greater effect to the predominant legislative intent.
25. Hearingson S. 510, supra note 9, at 127.
26. This point was made repeatedly in the Senate Hearings. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 510,
supra note 9, at 114 (statements of Messrs. Fleischer, Kaplan, and Mundheim).
27. Section 13(d) provides an exception to filing for any person or group which has not
acquired over 2% of the class of stock during the preceding 12-month period. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(6)(B) (1970). This subsection also gives the SEC power to exempt acquisitions in which the
purchasers do not seek control. Id. § 78m(d)(6)(D). The Commission has not yet promulgated rules
to exempt such acquisitions.
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State Police Power-Zoning-Validity of Local Ordinance Depends on Considerations of Regional, Not
Merely Local, General Welfare
Plaintiffs sued to have the New Jersey Zoning Act' declared unconstitutional and to have a municipal zoning ordinance enacted thereunder
declared invalid. The municipal ordinance provided that the floor sizes
for over 55 percent of the acreage of the township could be no smaller

than 1500 square feet and limited additional multifamily units to a total
of 700.2 Plaintiffs were six individuals, all with low incomes, representing
a class of people living outside the municipality 3 who, because of the
zoning restrictions in question, had been unsuccessful in seeking housing
within it, and two developers who owned land in the municipality. Plaintiffs argued that the New Jersey Zoning Act thwarts the general welfare
by failing to enumerate, as one of the Act's stated purposes, any provi-

sion for housing needs. 4 In addition, they contended that, even if the New
Jersey Zoning Act is upheld, the municipal zoning ordinance is still
deficient since it fails to promote reasonably the purpose of the Act with

respect to single and multifamily housing. Defendant municipality maintained that the ordinance aims at the creation of a balanced community
by encouraging moderate- and high-income housing to offset the existing
low-income housing. 5 Defendant also argued that the ordinance seeks to
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-30 to -51 (Supp. 1971). Section 40:55-32 provides: "Such regulations shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed for one or more of the
following purposes: to lessen congestion in the streets; secure safety from fire, flood, panic, and
other dangers; promote health, morals or the general welfare; provide adequate light and air;
prevent the overcrowding of land or buildings; avoid undue concentration of population. Such
regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of
the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view of conserving the value
of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality."
2. Madison Township Ordinance of Sept. 25, 1970. The ordinance imposes a minimum floor
space requirement in zone R40 of 1500 square feet, and in zone R80 of 1600 square feet. The
ordinance also restricts the acreage available to multifamily dwellings so that no more than 700
additional units can be built. Two-bedroom units cannot exceed 20% of the total units in any
apartment development, and units with 3 or more bedrooms are not permitted. The ordinance
further provides that no more than 200 units may be constructed in any year.
3. The nonresident plaintiffs obtained standing under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-47.1 (Supp.
1971), which provides that "any person, whether residing within or without the municipality, whose
right to use, acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action taken under the act to
which this act is a supplement, or whose rights to use, acquire, or enjoy property . . . under any
other law of this state or of the United States have been denied, violated or infringed by an action
or a failure to act" may bring suit under the New Jersey zoning provisions.
4. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-30 to -51.
5. The township conceded the invalidity of the numerical limitation on new multifamily units.
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protect local drainage systems from the effects of high density residential
development, which could lead to drainage problems and endanger water
resources. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, held,
the ordinance is totally invalid. When a local zoning ordinance aims at
excluding low income families from undeveloped areas of the municipality by unreasonably limiting the development of multifamily housing
and by imposing size restrictions on residential lots, it is invalid under
the New Jersey Zoning Act since it fails to promote a balanced municipality in accordance with the general welfare of the larger geographical
region. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, No. L7502-70 (N.J. Super. Ct., Oct. 27, 1971).
Although zoning disputes have been the source of frequent litigation, the United States Supreme Court rarely has spoken on the subject.
In Buchanan v. Warley, 6 a 1917 decision, it struck down a zoning ordinance that prohibited blacks from owning property in certain areas of
the municipality on the ground that the ordinance violated the equal
protection clause. In 1926, in the noted decision of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,' the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a local zoning ordinance that was designed to limit the expansion of
nearby industries into a suburban residential area. The Court, in resisting the due process attack on the ordinance, stressed the point that,
under the police power of the state, a strong presumption of constitutionality existed in favor of such ordinances.' Two years later, in Nectow v.
City of Cambridge,9 the Supreme Court made its last pronouncement
dealing with the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance. Echoing the
rationale set forth in Euclid, the Court held that a zoning ordinance is
invalid under the due process clause only "if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."'"
In the years since this group of decisions was handed down, there have
been a number of demographic and economic changes in and around the
larger metropolitan centers in this country that have prompted a serious
reexamination of the function of zoning ordinances in our society. At
the heart of these changes has been a steady stream of middle- and
upper-income families moving from the central cities into the surrounding suburbs, where the population density is significantly less. This lower
6. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
7.

272 U.S. 365 (1926).

8. Id. at 395.
9.

10.

277 U.S. 183 (1928).

Id. at 188.
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density results in a manageable demand for municipal services with
which suburban governments are financially able to cope. The possibility
of increased population in the suburbs, however, threatens to impair the
present ability of most suburban governments to meet that demand.
Acutely aware of this potential problem, suburban governments have
responded by discouraging the development of inexpensive housing and
multifamily dwellings because they fear that such property and its inhabitants will require more municipal services, primarily in the area of
education, than taxes on the property can support. Through the establishment of large minimum lot size and floor space requirements, suburban housing has been placed beyond the financial grasp of low-income
urban families, thus effectively confining them to the inner city. 12 The
ill effects of exclusionary zoning do not end there, however. Not only
do the urban poor lose housing opportunities, they also lose job opportunities. As those who hold the better urban jobs move to the suburbs,
the market for service-type jobs increases in the suburbs while it declines
in the inner city. Since those who formerly held such jobs in the inner
city cannot afford to move to the new suburban job locations because
of zoning restrictions, there is a labor shortage in the suburbs and widespread unemployment in the inner city.' 3 Opponents of exclusionary
zoning maintain that through this zoning device the suburbs seek to
enhance their own general welfare while ignoring the drastic effects that
the pursuit of this aim might have on the welfare of the inhabitants of
the inner city.' 4 They contend that exclusionary zoning is unconstitutional and have based their argument on both equal protection and due
process theories. The equal protection rationale, first applied in
Buchanan v. Warley,15 frequently has been utilized as a line of attack
and has been successful in some cases in which it was claimed that a
zoning ordinance was racially discriminatory." In other factual situa11. One study, for example, conducted in the Parkway School District of St. Louis, Missouri,
has calculated that any home valued at less than $26,274 will not generate enough taxes to support
its share of the educational system. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969).
12. In the instant case, for example, the zoning ordinance in question made housing within
the zoned areas so expensive as to be beyond the financial means of 90% of American families.
13. Reverse commuting-urban workers commuting to the suburbs to work-generally is
precluded by cost and inconvenience. See Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary
Zoning: The Beginningof the End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9, 12.
14. See Sager, Tight Little Islands:Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. Rav. 767,795 (1969).
15. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
16. See Anderson v. Forest Park, 239 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
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tions, however, equal protection has been a rather impotent constitutional weapon. Under the rational basis test, which traditionally has
been applied to zoning ordinances except when racial discrimination is
alleged, municipalities have been able to justify their ordinances simply
by showing a reasonable relation between the purpose of the ordinance
and community general welfare. 17 Courts have been unwilling to find an
equal protection violation when the ordinance has had the effect of
discriminating on an economic basis. Under the fourteenth amendment,
economic discrimination has been actionable only when it has resulted
in the violation of a fundamental right, such as the right to vote,' 8 or
the creation of a suspect classification, such as race. 9 Since no court has
held that exclusionary zoning produces either of those consequences,
municipalities thus far have avoided the application of the compelling
state interest test, which requires a greater showing of justification for a
zoning ordinance than does the rational basis test. As a result, equal
protection theory has not been a fruitful basis for assaulting exclusionary zoning. The other major method of attack has been the due process
clause. All zoning ordinances are based on the police power of the state
and enjoy a strong presumption of validity. The leading decision recognizing this idea is the Euclid case, in which the Supreme Court said that
a zoning ordinance will not be held invalid unless proved to be "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Although the position of
the Supreme Court has not changed since Euclid,2' some recent state
decisions appear to be relaxing the presumption of validity by requiring
the municipality to meet due process attacks on zoning ordinances with
some justification for their enactment. The first of these was Board of
County Supervisors v. Carper,22 in which an entire county was zoned to
forbid lots of less than two acres, even though the population problems
that prompted the ordinance were shown to exist only in the eastern third
of the county. Holding the ordinance invalid, the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals stated that the police power does not give municipalities the right arbitrarily or capricously to deprive a person of the
17. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
18. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
20. 272 U.S. at 395.
21. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works,
274 U.S. 325 (1927).
22. 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
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legitimate use of his property. This decision was followed by a series of
Pennsylvania decisions firmly establishing in that jurisdiction the view
that exclusionary zoning cannot always be justifed under the police
power of the state. The trend-setting case was NationalLand & Investment Co. v. Easttown Board ofAdjustment,2 in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declared that "a zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future
burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of public
services and facilities cannot be held valid." 24 Despite this favorable
trend, it should be noted that serious procedural obstacles still face the
opponents of exclusionary zoning. Besides overcoming the view prevailing in most jurisdictions that such zoning is within the police power,
plaintiffs must overcome the standing barrier, which traditionally has
prevented a nonresident from challenging zoning ordinances. Courts
generally have upheld zoning ordinances if they promote the health,
5
safety, morals, or general welfare of the persons within a community.2
Even courts sympathetic to hearing constitutional attacks on exclusionary zoning have been unwilling to hold on equal protection or due process grounds that the standing concept should be broadened to include
26
those who live outside the zoning municipality.
The court in the instant case first considered plaintiffs' challenge
to the constitutionality of the New Jersey Zoning Act. The court pointed
out that to be constitutionally valid the Act must reasonably further the
public health, safety, or general welfare. Under this standard, it concluded that even though the Act did not specifically include provision
for housing needs as one of its stated purposes such a requirement reasonably could be implied, in order to further the general welfare. z2 On
this basis, the court dismissed plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of the Act. The court then turned to plaintiffs' claim that the local
zoning ordinance in question is invalid because it fails to promote the
purposes of the New Jersey Zoning Act. It noted that the ordinance
23.
24.

419 Pa. 504,215 A.2d597 (1965).
Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612; see Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765

(1970) (absent extraordinary justification, a zoning ordinance with 2- and 3-acre minimum lot sizes
is completely unreasonable). But cf. Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194 (1952) (5-acre
minimum lot sizes upheld as preserving the character of the community, maintaining its property
values, and devoting the land to its most appropriate use).
25. See, e.g., Exparte Ackerman, 6 Cal. App. 5, 91 P. 429 (Ct. App. 1907); Cook County
v. Chicago, 311111. 234, 142 N.E. 512 (1924).
26. See. e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952);
Haar, Zoningfor Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1051 (1953).
27. No. L-7502-70 at 5.
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makes housing in the affected areas so expensive that it is out of the
economic reach of over 90 percent of all families in the county and in
the nation. The court also noted that defendant municipality is seeking
to attract new industry from the central cities and that exclusionary
zoning in the suburb would tend to aggravate the crowding of the inner
cities of the region by making it virtually impossible for the poor urban
dweller to afford restricted suburban housing. The court concluded that
the ordinance in question is fiscal zoning-an attempt to hold down the
future cost of government services resulting from increased population.
Nevertheless, in the court's estimation, the ordinance had to be judged
on the basis of whether it provides a balanced plan for the region as a
whole, and not on the basis of its fiscal objectives. Persuaded by the
National Land decision, in which the court struck down large-lot zoning
in undeveloped areas because of a lack of reasonable relation to the
general welfare,2 the instant court determined that "the general welfare
does not stop at each municipal boundary. 12 9 It added that significant
areas of vacant and developable land should not be zoned with such large
minimum lot sizes that regional as well as local housing needs are
shunted aside? ° The court then considered defendant's drainage argument and noted that apparently no scientific study of the flood and
drainage problems of smaller lots was made before passing the ordinance and that there was no evidence that those problems would be
prevented by low population density zoning. The court also cited
National Land for the proposition that a municipality cannot "stand in
the way of the natural forces which send our growing population into
hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live." 31
Accordingly, it ruled that defendant, in enacting its zoning ordinances,
had an obligation to consider the housing needs of not only its own
citizens, but of those in the region as well.
While the instant decision at first glance seems disappointingly
narrow because it does not rely on either of the familiar, traditional
constitutional law mainstays-equal protection and due process-a
closer analysis reveals that it has some startling and potentially significant implications. The instant court was afforded an opportunity to
repudiate the traditional police power test for local zoning ordinances
28. The instant court distinguished Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d
378 (1952), on the ground that most of the land in question here was vacant and therefore had no
established residential character or residential property value.
29. No. L-7502-70, at 12.
30. Id.
31. 419 Pa. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
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in reaching its decision, but chose not to do so. Instead, the court held
that the general welfare, which must be considered in the passage of any
state or local legislation, now means "regional general welfare" rather
than merely the "general welfare of those residing within the boundaries
of a municipality." The instant court in effect changed one of the statutory bases for justification under due process, rather than specifically
changing the true constitutional test. Unquestionably, this new rationale
marks a significant departure from prior law. If the concept of regional
general welfare gains wide acceptance, it may provide opponents of
exclusionary zoning with the legal weapon that they have been seeking
to mount a successful challenge to the validity of such laws. On a practical level, the regional general welfare approach has at least three crucial
advantages over the traditional equal protection and due process theories. First, it provides a possible method of circumventing the standing
problem that heretofore has frustrated suits against exclusionary zoning.
Even though standing was conferred by statute on the nonresident plaintiffs in the instant case, 3 one of the implications of the court's reasoning
is that the same result would have been reached in the absence of the
statute. The instant decision plainly recognizes that persons living outside municipal boundaries have certain recognizable interests in local
zoning laws. The critical point, however, is that the instant court related
this conclusion more to the idea of regional general welfare than to the
statute. If the standing implications of the instant decision are not followed, then it seems that the expanded concept of general welfare is
rendered meaningless since thq rights presumably acquired through it
could not be asserted by nonresidents of a community. Secondly, the
concept of regional general welfare may lessen the formidable burden of
proof problems that exclusionary zoning foes now face. One of the chief
reasons is that under this expanded concept suburban municipalities will
have to weigh interests that they never before have been compelled to
consider. These new interests focus primarily upon the housing needs of
persons living in the surrounding areas. Opponents of exclusionary zoning now may be able to turn this to their advantage. They could attack
such zoning by showing that no consideration whatever was given these
interests or that they were unjustifiably ignored. This approach contrasts
sharply with establishing under traditional general welfare principles
that an exclusionary zoning ordinance has no rational purpose, a task
that has been futile far more often than not. Thirdly, the regional general
welfare concept presents the basic issues in exclusionary zoning cases in
32.

See note 3 supra.
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a light that is true to the competing social and economic interests which
usually are involved. If accepted, it means that courts no longer will
draw the legal battle line between the suburb and an individual land
developer. On the contrary, the battle line will be drawn between the
suburb and the urban poor. This view of the issues seems to be the most
realistic position that the courts could take and the one that is most
conducive to a careful analysis of the case and a fair decision, whatever
the ultimate fate of exclusionary zoning may be.
Regardless of the more practical consequences stemming from general acceptance of the regional general welfare concept, there are some
broader aspects to the instant decision that should not be overlooked.
As a judicial doctrine, the regional general welfare concept suggests
consequences that courts must fully understand. If, indeed, it leads to
the crumbling of suburbia's protective barriers, there will be an aftermath of bitterness. An end to exclusionary zoning strikes at the very
heart of some of the most basic middle- and upper-class values; it may
signal an end to the idea that a person can choose the type of community
he wants to live in and be confident of its future desirability and continuity. Whether this change is right or wrong, strong resistance is sure to
arise, and it is conceivable that it will resemble to a great degree the kind
of resistance that has plagued school desegregation in this country since
1954. People may attempt to do by private means what exclusionary
zoning formerly achieved for them as a matter of enacted law. In the
final analysis, courts may be compelled to conclude that, even armed
with the regional general welfare concept, they cannot eradicate all of
the vestiges of exclusionary zoning. Yet, despite these potential drawbacks, it is most difficult to criticize the instant court for its conviction
that the traditional zoning prerogatives of municipalities must give way
to broader and more compelling social needs. Hopefully, the instant
court's action will spur other courts to a similar understanding of the
concept of general welfare. Unfortunately, that at best can be no more
than an interim answer; in the end, only legislation, both state and
federal, offers the potential for a comprehensive and enduring resolution3 of the great issues now dividing the suburban rich and the urban
poor.
33. See Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Zoning-SnobZoning: Must a
Man's Home be a Castle?, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 339 (1970).

BOOK REVIEWS
Close Corporations Examined
CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS.

By William H. Painter. Boston: Little Brown &Co., 1971. Pp. xiv, 501.
$30.00.
The dilemma of business planning is that to understand its parts it
is first necessary to understand the whole, but to understand the whole
it is necessary to understand its parts. Professor Painter has produced a
book that is of substantial assistance to the lawyer or studeni confronting this dilemma. The method of attack employed by the author is to
address simultaneously both the "parts" of business planning and the
"whole" of business planning in a manner sufficiently concise to permit
the reader to recall the first chapter of the book as he finishes the last.
Yet the treatment is sufficiently detailed to enable the reader to gain
more than a mere glimpse of the tax and corporate law problems involved.
The author describes the alternatives to the close corporation and
the organization of a close corporation in the first and second chapters,
explains control and operational matters in the middle chapters, and
concludes with a discussion of a close corporation's first public offering
and of the sale of a close corporation. The format selected sets forth the
tax and corporate law aspects of the closely-held corporation in a readable and interesting fashion. It emphasizes the practical business context in which legal problems arise and uses examples liberally to illustrate the application of particular concepts. One of the author's most
notable achievements is the concise, simple, and understandable statements of difficult concepts.
As the author acknowledges in his preface, the book draws heavily
on specialized treatises such as Bittker &Eustice, FederalIncome Taxation of Corporationsand Shareholders,and Loss, Securities Regulation.

In this regard, it is unfortunate that the timing of the publication of the
book resulted in citations to the second edition of Bittker and Eustice,
rather than the recently published third edition of that work.
As a research tool the book should prove useful in enabling the
attorney to get an overview of the legal problems involved in the business
planning problem that confronts him together with ample citations to
more detailed works for further research into the problems he has identified. Also useful are the appendices of the book containing comparative
summaries of the advantages and disadvantages of various alternatives
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in business planning such as the decision to incorporate and methods of
selling the business.
There are, however, two important omissions in the book. First,
there is very little discussion of important accounting problems that may
influence the decision of the business planner on a particular problem,
especially with respect to pooling-of-interest or purchase method accounting for corporate acquisitions. Secondly, a discussion of the basic
rules relating to corporate tax loss carryover would be of assistance in
the chapter dealing with corporate acquisitions.
In summary, the author has accomplished his purpose of providing
a concise, readable, and practical book on the wide range of tax, securities, and corporate law aspects of the closely held corporation. It is a
book that will be of use to the general practitioner as well as the business
specialist who wishes a broad overview of business planning problem
areas. Were it not for the 30 dollar price, the book could be very useful
to students as well. It is hoped that the publishers will produce a paperback student edition at a substantially reduced price.
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